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Stefan Braun* Social and Racial Tolerance and
Freedom of Expression in a
Democratic Society: Friends or
Foes? Regina v. Zundel
I. Introduction
In Regina v. Zundel' the Ontario Court of Appeal held that s. 177 of the
Canadian Criminal Code,2 entitled "Spreading false news," did not
contravene the guarantee of freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms3 and that even if it did, it constituted a
permissible regulation under s. 1 of the Charter.4 Section 177 of the Code
punishes "everyone who wilfully publishes a statement, tale, or news that
he knows is false and that causes or is likely to cause injury or mischief
to a public interest." 5 The defendant was charged under the section for
publishing a tract denying that the Holocaust occured and alleging a
Jewish conspiracy to cover-up the true historical facts in order to arouse
world sympathy and promote pecuniary self-gain.6 In finding the
impugned section of the Criminal Code constitutional, the Court held
that the reference to "a public interest" embraced the public interest in
"social and racial tolerance."'7 Significantly, it further found that the
likelihood of harm occuring to that interest as a result of the
dissemination of the impugned speech did not have to be established by
the State in order to obtain a conviction. 8
Zundel is not concerned with the different statutory language of the
"hate propoganda" section of the Canadian Criminal Code9 under which
* B.A., M.A. (U. of T.), LL.B. (Osgoode Hall), LL.M. (L.S.E.); of the Ontario Bar.
1. 58 O.R. 2d 129, at 155-157.
2. R.S.C. 1970, c. 34. s. 177.
3. Constitution Act 1982, Part I, enacted by the Canada Act, 1982. U.K. 1982, c. 11, Part I,
s. 2. "Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: (b) freedom of thought, belie
opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication."
4. "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out
in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified
in a free and democratic society." Id, s. 1.
5. Supra, note 2.
6. Supra, note 1, at 141-142. Pointing out that s. 177 only prohibited false facts, the court
focused on the defendant's assertion that the Holocaust did not occur and stated that
"considered as a whole" the defendant's tract was an assertion of fact, not opinion. On the fact
at issue, the defendant argued that "thousands", not some six million, had died.
7. Id, at 160.
8. Id, at 152-153.
9. Supra, note 2, s. 281.2. The language of the section differs from s. 177 in a number of
important respects. For example, under s. 281.2(1) the communication of statements in any
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the accused might have been charged. Nor is the case a decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada. Nevertheless, it is a case of seminal
importance in laying bare the essence and parameters of the problem of
proscription of "social" or "socio-political" speech 10 for fear of its
proselytic effects in a democratic polity like Canada that will likely form
the touchstone for future debate. The case, either directly or indirectly,
raises four areas that are of concern to political and social scientists as
well as constitutional lawyers: the purposes, fears and political premise of
freedom of expression in the context of social and racial tolerance; the
place of certain traditional exceptions to freedom of expression; the role
of the court as a forum for safe-guarding social or socio-political truths;
and theory and practice in a range of options available to the court in
reconciling freedom of expression and social tolerance.
II. Purposes, Fears and Political Premise of Freedom of Expression in
the Context of Social and Racial Tolerance
1. The Fundamental Distinction Between Social Purposes and Political
Process
The court, in Zundel, found that the impugned speech of the defendant
was inconsistent with the purposes for which freedom of expression is
said to exist in a democracy. The court looked at three "theories" of the
purposes of freedom of expression: self-fulfilment or self-development;
search for truth; and the working needs of a parliamentary democracy.
The court's examination, it is submitted, is flawed and incomplete. The
"flaw" stems from its "time-static" or "time-dependent" understanding of
public place is sufficient to sustain conviction if the mode of communication is such as to incite
hatred against an identifiable group (Le., any section of the public distinguished by colour, race,
religion or ethnic origin) where such incitement is likely to lead to a breach of thepeace. Under
s. 281.2(3) everyone who, by communicating a statement in public wilfully promotes hatred
against an identifiable group is guilty. Under this subsection, however, a number of defences
are available: truth; good faith attempt by argument to establish an opinion upon a religious
subject; a matter of public interest, discussion of which was for public benefit, if the accused
on reasonable grounds believed his statements to be true; good faith attempt to achieve the
removal of matters tending to produce feelings of hatred towards an identifiable group.
10. For delineation of the contours of this category of speech and the dividing line ofjustifiable
proscription, see infra, Part III Some Exceptions to Freedom of Expression.
11. Supra, note 1, at 148. The court only uses the word "self-fulfilment". However, it is clear
that the word is intended to be understood in a positive sense of self-development,
enlightenment, intellectual and emotional enrichment, not in the negativte sense of self-
centeredness, self-withdrawal, or selfishness. The court also seems to present the three theories
as possible alternatives: "Differing reasons have been expressed .... Some have based it on
.... Others have based it on ... A third rationale is .... In fact, as this article will attempt
to show, although the points of emphasis are different, there is a common theme underlying all
these theories, that unfettered freedom of political or social speech ultimately promotes
democratic self-government and inhibits conditions ripe for mob rule and tyranny.
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freedom of expression. In the result, the court fails to draw any distinction
between freedom of expression as "social purpose" and freedom of
expression as "ongoing political process." For example, with respect to
self-fulfilment, the court merely states that "spreading falsehoods
knowingly" does not "further self-fulfilment."' 12 What this reasoning fails
to address, however, is that the purposes of freedom of expression and the
freedom itself, may not be synonomous - ends and means may not be
identical. Freedom of political or social expression is an ongoing political
process as well as a social or political goaL It is imperative that the
process not be confused with its purposes. It is not at all self-evident that
the purposes of freedom of social, political or socio-political expression
such as self-development, attainment of social or political truth and
effective parliamentary democracy are better achieved by a political
process that censors social falsehoods for fear of its effects. Unless there
exists a nation free of bigots and racists because social and racial
falsehoods are suppressed, truth, self-development, and social and racial
harmony must remain ideals and the possible political processes a
question of relative effectiveness in striving to achieve the elusive ideal.
Whatever the process, therefore, it must first be recognized that all
societies will undoubtedly fall short of the ideal. Those who argue for
unfettered freedom of social and political expression recognize that there
has never been a society that has not fallen short of the ideal. Thus, a
bigot may remain a bigot; the truth may sometimes be lost, distorted or
obfuscated, at any given instance, in a plethora of viewpoints and
assertions of fact; parliament may not always work effectively, act fairly,
or decide wisely in the matter of social policies. But this does not mean
that there is something "wrong" with unfettered freedom of political or
social expression that is in need of "social fixing." Democracy is not, nor
was it intended to be, a system of social perfection. In guaranteeing
freedom of expression it could not have been the intention of democracy
to guarantee political or social Utopia13, but rather, to block the
emergence of conditions ripe for political tyranny by a socially and
politically imperfect species.
Social and political truth, self-development, effective, fair and wise
government are, in political practice, ultimately elusive goals and fluid
ideals. Paradoxically, their contours can only be more clearly defined and
their more noble vision brought closer to social reality by a political
process that neither seeks to legally guarantee social Utopia nor to do so
by cleansing itself of the taint of social and political falsehoods. At the
12. Id, at 155.
13. See the Classic: Thomas Moore, Utopia (New York: Norton, 1975), N.Y. (1975). See also
M. Walzer, "Philosophy and Democracy" (1981), 9 Political Theory 379.
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core of the theories behind freedom of unfettered social and political
expression, is the seminal idea that the alternative - prohibiting such
expression - is ultimately worse. Constrain the process, however well
intentioned, and the ideals will grow more distant.
In the case of a purpose such as self-development, this means that
while one must accept that all the bigots of this world cannot become
great social humanitarians, some bigots are more likely to grow and
develop in a positive sense through a process that continuously and
publicly exposes them to contrary viewpoints every time one of them
speaks than one that shields them through enforced silence. "It is," wrote
Louis Brandeis, "the function of speech to free men from the bondage of
irrational fears." 14 In contrast, enforced silence acts to confirm these fears
and biases.
With regard, specifically, to the "search for truth" purpose of freedom
of expression, it is again important to not treat "goal" as synonomous
with "process." "Spreading falsehoods knowingly," observed the court in
Zundel, "is the antithesis of seeking truth through the free exchange of
ideas."15 The elusive goal of social and racial tolerance through the
unquestioned supremacy of social and racial truth is not, however,
synonomous with individual intention to seek truth. If freedom of
expression protected only those seeking and speaking social truth and
never those seeking and speaking social falsehoods than the social
significance of truth would eventually be lost and its social vulnerability
become unappreciated. Can the historical truth of the genocide
committed against the Jewish people, more than two generations ago,
ring with the same resounding current educative value when the Zundels
of this world are silenced or free to speak their message of hate? Truth,
per se, has no intrinsic social value. It acquires this only when it can
shape the public mind - when its social message and social lessons are
fully appreciated. The greater threat to social truth is not social falsehood,
but that it become insignificant and irrelevant Social truth must be
regularly challenged - its message kept alive - if it is to remain current
and meaningful. The process of vigorous clash and interplay of social
truth with social falsehood rejuvenates the message of truth Silence, not
falsehood, allows the message to die. In a world legally sanitized of any
evil words there can be no true sense either of the significance or the
ultimate vulnerability of good words. Without any political room for
expressive juxtaposition of social falsehood with social truth, truth loses
its contemporary social significance, atrophies and untimately leaves a
14. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 at 376 (re teaching of criminal syndicalism).
15. Supra, note 1, at 155.
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dangerous vacuum where social evil, unappreciated because unheard, can
in times of social crisis more easily take its place. The deceitful and the
dominant, rather than the honest and the moderate, can then take the
place of truth. As stated by Louis Brandeis: "Those who won our
independence believed... that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert
people."' 6 History shows that when there is little "news" in the "truth",
there tends ultimately to be little "truth" in the "news". 1
7
2. Freedom of Social Expression as a Political Process: To Be Feared?
Or Its Fears To Be Heeded?
Cases such as Zundel see in unfettered freedom of social expression a
great danger that social falsehoods will infect and gravely injure the
public mind. Superficially, the genocide commited against the Jewish
people in Germany and Eastern Europe would seem to support this fear.
Historically, however, the most aggregious racial and social intolerance of
racial minorities, particularly of Jews, occured not in the Western
democracies which enjoyed the greatest freedom of expression but in
those polities that failed entirely at political democracy - like Germany,
the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc countries - monarchical,
oligarchical, or tyrannical polities that could historically only
accommodate the most feeble or short-lived freedom of expression while
in transition between dictatorships. 18 History strongly suggests that it is
not freedom of political and social expression that drives social
intolerance, but social intolerance, whose deep-seated causes lie
elsewhere and are fortified by State repression, that stifles freedom of
expression. One should be wary not to confuse the symptom with the
disease. To fear social disintegration through a singular fear of free
expression - as if free expression harboured a consuming desire to self-
destruct - without regard to the larger state of political society within
which it must operate, is to fear in a vacuum. 19 In a long standing
16. Supra, note 14, at 375.
17. A favouritejoke making the rounds in the Russian and East European community makes
reference to the two official State newspapers in the Soviet Union, Pravda ("The Truth") and
Izvestia ("The News"). It is said, only partly tongue-in-cheek: "There is no Izvestia in Pravda
and no Pravda in Izvestia."
18. On the short-lived political freedoms under Kerensky in the Soviet Union, the reader
might find interesting the "inside" account by Alexander Kerensky, Russia And History's
Turning Point, (New York: Pearce, 1965), esp. 93-115; 324-419. On the short-lived freedom
in German (Weimar Republic) see Eugene N. Anderson, "Freedom And Authoritarianism in
German History," in G. A. Almond ed., The Struggle For Democracy In Germany, (New
York: Russel, 1965), at 3-33.
19. Long ago, in Queen v. Russel, Chief Justice Wilde emphasized this point in a case
concerning seditious utterances:
You cannot, as it seems to me, form a correct judgement of how far the evidence tends
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pluralistic democracy like Canada, commited to the notion of "freedom
of expression" the question must be asked: What is to be feared more -
State fettering of free expression or the presumed consuming, destructive,
proselytic effects of such freedom?
As an initial observation in this inquiry, it may be contended that it
was not suppression of social falsehoods but, on the contrary, suppression
of social truths, that contributed to the social and racial intolerance in
Eastern Europe and Germany. The freedom of speech that was
relentlessly repressed in these countries was the freedom to speak well,
not ill, of Jews. But opponents of social falsehoods are proponents of
social truth. They seek to guarantee social truth by repressing social
falsehoods only, not truth or speech generally.
If, however, it becomes politically acceptable in a self-governing,
pluralistic polity that one group can invoke the police machinery of the
State to muzzle the social falsehoods of members of another group for
fear of prejudicial proselytization of the social psyche, this leaves that
right open to all groups that may one day hold or command the reins of
governmental power. This ultimately presents a far greater danger to
social tolerance than the freedom that is the subject of political repression.
Consider the possible long-run repercussions of a case like Zundel. The
court adopted a liberal approach to the admissibility of Crown evidence,
including historical evidence, learned treatises, expert opinion, eyewitness
testimony, and the definition of social or historical fact.20 Within such a
framework, needed to disprove social or socio-political falsehoods, socio-
political configurations that might prevail in society from time to time
may seek to forcibly silence the false "statements, tales or news" of social
rivals on the grounds of the speech's feared likelihood to cause "mischief
or injury" to the public interest in social tolerance. The following are just
a few examples of potentially damaging false social statements, tales or
to establish the crime imputed to the defendant without bringing into the box with you
a knowledge of the present state of society because the conduct of every individual in
regard to the effect which that conduct is calculated to produce must depend upon the
state of society in which he lives. This may be innocent in one state of society, because
it may not tend to disturb the peace or to interfere with the right of the community
which at another time and in a different state of society, in consequence of its different
tendency, may be open to just censure. (1683 9. State Tr. 577)
20. Supra, note 1, at 175-180 and 191-200. On ambit of fact the Court said:
Although there are individual items or passages in the pamphlet which, considered
separately, might properly be characterized as opinions, we consider that it was open
to the jury to find that the pamphlet, considered as a whole, asserted as a fact that Jews
were not exterminated as a result of government policy during the Nazi regime, that the
Holocaust did not occur and it is an invention or a hoax to enable Israel and Jews to
collect huge reparation payments from Germany." (at 191).
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news about particular social groups or historical events that might be
"caught."
a) Homosexuals: "sexually irresponsible; dangerous aids spreaders"
b) Single mothers: "sexually loose, socially irresponsible, welfare
frauds."
c) Feminists: "conspiracy to control the government to oppress
men, undermine the family, deceive the public on
discrimination in order to arouse sympathy and
pecuniary self-gain."
d) Upper Middle Class: "tax frauds; exploiters of the working
(Bourgeoisie) class; main obstacle to social progress;
social threat."
e) Men: "instinctive rapists, wife and child abusers; psychologically
harass their wives; socially, sexually, economically
irresponsible."
f) The Poor: "don't want to work; should be starved back to
work."
g) Seal Fishermen: "brutal, cruel, sadistic killers; had brought the
seal population to virtual extinction."
h) Doctors: "greedy, irresponsible, incompetent, untrustworthy."
i) Unions: "communist fronts; power must be broken."
j) During the Vietnam War, by the military of college student
protestors: "communists, bums, cowards."
By the students of the military: "warmongers, profiteers,
intellectual morons."
Of the Vietnam War: "caused by war-mongering American
generals and profiteering industrialists."
k) Mentally impaired: "dangerous; keep them all locked up."
1) Senior citizens: "pleading poverty at the expense of needy young
families; senile; useless; intolerable drain on the
public purse."
m) Poor Widows: "poor because they chose to stay at home rather
than work; weak, talentless, lazy."
Restricting the class of recognized maligned is possible. The hate
propaganda section of the Criminal Code, unlike the open-ended
wording of s. 177 of the Code under which Zundel was charged, attempts
to do this by restricting its remedy to a limited category of "identifiable"
persons.21 The fact that all other social groups, including for example,
women, homosexuals, the mentally handicapped, senior citizens,
21. Supra, note 2.
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children, doctors etc. can be maligned, illustrates the inherent political
fluidity of such categories. The very question of what criteria politically
opposed occasional governing coalitions might, in their discretion, come
to accept in drafting their language of protected maligned, illustrates the
dangers of sowing "today" the seeds for political power struggle against
speech (at the expense of counter-speech and education) "tomorrow."2
Pluralistic, self-governing societies are not politically static. Who is to say
that social speech viewed as mere "obnoxious" social commentary
"today" will not be viewed as "profoundly" unacceptable "anti-social
prejudices" "tomorrow" by a different governing majority? Or that social
speech seen as "profoundly anti-social prejudices" "today" will not come
to be viewed as mere "obnoxious" social commentary "tomorrow?"
Whatever the boundaries of the categories of social censorship, those
boundaries are, ultimately, as fleeting as the occasional governing
majorities who might come to write them.
Moreover, human beings are fallible and human beings in power are
both fallible and power-seeking. The right of fallible and power-seeking
human politicians to respond to particular prevailing coalitions
determined to muzzle the political or social falsehoods of social rivals can
be misused or misapplied for self-serving interests and not for the larger
social good for which it was intended. The right of politically selective
prosecution, using existing or reformulated social censorship legislation,
means that few, if any, group or groups can be sure that it (they) will not
one day be put on the "short end" of the prosecution stick by social rivals
in power who may allow only their own social falsehoods to reign
supreme in the market place of social speech. In this social censorship
rivalry, however, not all are ultimately likely to be equal losers. For, in
time, the dominant tend to squeeze out the weak. The cautious and the
weak are more apt to exercise self-censorship for fear of over-stepping the
bounds of accepted social truth and inviting onerous prosecution and
financially ruinous litigation. Dominant political groups of the day will,
over time, be more likely to hear only those social truths as well as only
those social falsehoods they wish to hear. The right to politically selective
suppression of public falsehoods, therefore, distorts the "natural"
22. E.g., history of vulnerability to intolerance; present vulnerability; likely or expected future
vulnerability; physical, economic, social, political or psychological harm; race, colour, creed,
kinship, lineage, blood, biology, shared experience, affiliation; economic status, income;
deemed willingness to defend against intolerance; deemed degree, if any, of group
responsibility for intolerance. Doug Christie, lawyer to both Zundel and school teacher Jim
Keegstra, who was convicted for wilfuly promoting hatred against Jews in his classroom, tried
to buttress his case by arguing that "hatred can be justified" citing the example of Martin
Luther's arguments against the Catholic Church in the 16th century. See The Canadian Jewish
News, Wed. Sept. 23, 1987, p. 10.
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spectrum of public speech. It undermines the process of public choice by
forcibly "bending" it to conform to prevailing and, ultimately, dominant
political winds. It sets in motion a power struggle directed to capturing
the right to "bend" the public viewpoint through censorship rather than
through counter-speech and education. This erodes the freedom of
expression of all but particularly of the weak, the moderate and the
impecunious.
Freedom of expression is not simply a set of "noble" goals but a
vulnerable political process. It is a process or conduit by which a self-
governing people in a pluralistic polity - some good, some evil, some
intelligent, some ignorant - can tell their elected representatives and
their social rivals what they think, how they feel and what they wanL
This process is a cornerstone of democracy for without it self-government
itself is impossible.23 It is a process not just for "today." It is a process also
for "tomorrow." The fettering of this process for "good" ultimately brings
democracy into as much jeopardy as the fettering of this process for "ill."
The guardianship of public fact, no less than the guardianship of public
opinion, cannot be entrusted or abandonned to the politically selective,
potentially self-serving or misguided choices of occasional governing
majorities. A process that equally protects social falsehoods and social
truths alike - a process that protects and invigorates public speech -
rather than one that seeks to dictate public truth - best protects and
proclaims public truth. For this reason, American jurists like Louis
Brandeis have passionately argued that forcible State suppression of
socio-political speech in a self-governing, pluralistic polity must be the
very last, not first, resort - when there clearly is no other remedy:
23. Some judicial recognition of this was apparent even before the Charter (either express or,
more often, implicit using statutory interpretation or distribution of powers arguments to
protect expression.) See Duff C.J. and Cannon J. in Reference Re Alberta Statutes, [1938]
S.C.R. 100 (right of press to freely and fearlessly criticize government); Porter C.J. in R. v.
Coles Ltd (1969), 49 D.L.R. 2d 34 at 40 (freedom to treat human sexuality with "complete
candor" is part of a larger freedom to disseminate "ideas, opinions and concepts of the
imagination" that is "fundamental to progress in a free society" and "should not be curtailed
except in extreme circumstances"); Boucher v. The Queen, [1951] S.C.R. 265 (Rand J.
expressly recognizing that the offence of seditious libel, for fear of social disaffection and
hostility, is no longer a justification for repression of expression in a democratic polity - see
note 52a). For more implicit recognition see: Roncarelli v. Duplesis, [1959] S.C.R. 121
(statutory interpretation used to defeat government's licencing discrimination based on
defendant's political activities as bondsman for Jehovah's Witnesses); Switzman v. Elbing,
[1957] S.C.R. 285 (distribution of powers argument used to defeat government padlocking of
defendant's premise for "propogating communism."); Smith and Rhuland v. The Queen,
[1953] 2 S.C.R. 95 (statutory interpretation used to defeat labour relations board's refusal to
certify union because its leader was a communist); Saumer v. City of Quebec, [1953] D.L.R.
641 (distribution of powers argument used to defeat attempt to repress unpopular groups, like
the Jehovah's Witnesses, by municipal scheme that gave Chief-of-Police the right to inspect
contents of materials distributed in the streets).
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No danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present unless
the evidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall
before there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to expose
through discussion the falsehoods and fallacies, to avert the evil by the
process of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not
enforced silence. 24
In view of the dangerous "side-effects" of the "cure" of social censorship,
can one ignore the imminence and extent of the state of the "disease" in
Canadian society? The "cure" must not, over time, become worse than
the "disease. '25 In particular, "mischief" or even occasional "injury" to a
social interest should not, in the give-and-take of a pluralistic society, be
sufficient to set in motion political conditions corroding not just any
freedom but a freedom that is the political cornerstone on which
democracy itself is built.
26
There is another reason behind freedom of social and political
expression that was not addressed by the court in Zundel. Freedom of
expression for all delegitimizes resort to force by some. When we have
the right to speak - to persuade, to convince - we have a lesser claim
on the need to resort to force to accomplish our goals. Freedom of
expression for all exalts talk at the expense of force. Repression of some
exalts force at the expense of talk. Repression drives determined threats
underground. It encourages resort to surreptitious acts as a substitute for
the impermissible speech.27 Moreover, freedom of expression exalts
genuine debate at the expense of "pretend" expression that seeks to
escape the censor's knife or to curry favour with prevailing political
winds. When we are allowed to think as we like and say what we think
we are less likely to pretend to be true that which we do not believe -
to be publicly, intellectually dishonest in what we feel. Private social or
political beliefs will be less at variance with public pronouncements when
we are allowed to speak our minds. In contrast, suppression of speech
tends to transform the open into the hidden and feared words into feared
acts. The size of a festering social problem and the identity of its believers
and sympathisers become more difficult to assess, the extent of the danger
24. Supra, note 14 at 377.
25. As noted, in part at least, by Jeremy Bentham:
What ought to be the object of the legislature... ? [HI]e ought to assure himself of two
things... ; that in every case the incidents which he tries to prevent are really evil and
secondly, that if evils, they are greater than those which he employs to prevent them.
W Lacqueur & Rubin eds., The Human Rights Reader (Philadelphia: Temple, 1979) at 85.
26. See text for note 91.
27. This is to be contrasted with the effect on the cautious and the weak which is more likely
to be self-censorship for fear of prosecution and costly litigation. The field of public speech is
therefore left clear for social extremists.
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more difficult to measure and the steps needed to guard against it more
difficult to formulate.
In the case of a phenomenon so difficult to measure as social
intolerance, the true extent of the dangers may be temporarily masked by
repressive laws against intolerant speech, only to suddenly raise its ugly
head in times of social crises on an unsuspecting public lulled into a false
sense of complacency. In the interim, repression tends to arouse
sympathy among some members of the public for those selected for
repression and intolerance for those doing the repression. Others,
particularly in a self-governing society, may begin to wonder why, if it is
only patent falsehood which is sought to be espoused, do they need to be
protected?28 Is the State trying to "hide something" from the people?
Could there be "something" in what the repressed seeks to say, but is
prevented from saying? In these conditions, acts of intolerance by the
repressed extremist are more likely to be viewed by some as
understandable frustration given the denial of the right to speak; by the
fearful as justifying that much more repression. Focus begins to shift from
the content of the speech to the denial of the right to speak. Talk is of
force and censorship, for and against; talk itself is less exalted. Concern
over the evil content of the message becomes lost in concern over who
shall be allowed to say what. These conditions are the very antithesis of
racial and social harmony. Alternatively, allowing patent social and
political falsehoods would do more to identify the threat, expose extreme
views, irrational fears and biases, let off steam, educate the social and
historical illiterate and preclude making martyrs of maniacs, than to win
over racist converts. 29 Freedom of expression, therefore, promotes
conditions for smooth, gradual, manageable change in the long run rather
than sudden, violent and unexpected political challenges. As stated by
Brandeis:
[The Founding Fathers knew] that it is hazardous to discourage thought,
hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds
hate; that hate menaces stable government .... ; that the fitting remedy for
evil counsels is good ones. Believing in the power of reason ... they
28. In upholding the trial judge's decision to not take judicial notice of the Holocaust, the
Court of Appeal made it clear that it was doing so on the grounds that taking judicial notice
would have been prejudicial to the defendant in assessing his knowledge of the falsity of his
assertion and not because it doubted that the existence of the Holocaust was a matter "so
notorious as not to be the subject of dispute among reasonable men." One must then ask what
was the purpose of trial, unless, of course, the Court was suggesting that Canadians are not
"reasonable persons."
29. The particular ineffectiveness, in this regard, of the trial process of social censorship, is
discussed as a practical matter in Part IV, Adjudicating on Social Truths: The Role of The
Court.
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eschewed silence coerced by law - the argument of force in its worse
forms .... 30
3. The Political Premise of Freedom of Expression
Finally, there is a premise behind freedom of expression also left
unaddressed by the Court in Zundel. It is a political premise that
underpins all the other arguments. The purpose of freedom of expression
does not simply reflect a fear of the unintended consequences of State
repression of social falsehoods. It also and most importantly reflects a
confidence - a confidence that, as a rule, a self-governing citizentry of
a long-standing democracy must surely be able to choose for themselves
between social truths and social falsehoods leaving it to the ordinary laws
against unlawful conduct to punish those few who choose to act badly.
To believe otherwise, even in the case of an established democracy, is to
attack the very premise of democratic government. It says that the people
as a whole cannot, in any state of political society, be trusted to recognize
and reject social falsehoods. The people need always to be protected, at
the discretion of the politicians of the day. The occasional governing
majority must do the thinking for them. They know better what society
should or should not hear. They will ensure that the people will think
"right." Yet, if the people cannot be trusted to distinguish patent social
fact from patent socialfiction, such as the assertion that the Holocaust did
not occur, how can such people ever be trusted to accomplish the much
more difficult task of distinguishing evil social opinion from good social
opinion? These difficult choices daily confront all self-governing
peoples.31 Indeed, how are self-governing people, shielded from exposure
to falsehoods, ever going to learn to distinguish truth from lies - to make
responsible choices for themselves? 32 Speech paternalism - the idea that
30. Supra, note 14 at 376.
31. The Court, in Zundel, was very careful to interpret "statement, tale or news" in s. 177 of
the Code as refering to fact only and not opinion. (But see supra, note 20.) Tyrannies suppress
opinion. The fact that the line between social or socio-political opinion and social or socio-
political fact can often be an amorphous one did not seem to disturb the Court. Nor was the
Court concerned that opinion might be far more pernicious and that fact censorship may
therefore be ineffective and dangerous. See- Part IV and especially note 67.
32. Keeping people shielded from social falsehoods tends, therefore, to become a self-realizing,
self-justifying prophecy. On a more practical level, however, how, indeed, are a self-governing
people enjoying a free press going to be slielded from exposure to intolerant messages in an
age of instant information dissemination that refuses to recognize national boundaries?
Illustrating the problem is the recent reporting and repeating of the anti-semitic remarks of
National Front leader Jean Marie LePen in The Canadian Jewish News itself.
French Jewry is outraged and alarmed by right-wing leader Jean Marie LePen's claim
in a national broadcast that the Holocaust, if indeed it occured, has been exaggerated
and in any event it was only a footnote to history .... In the radio interview he said,
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the State knows better; that is must and can think for the people - denies
the essence of self-government. It is the germ of tyranny, not
democracy.33
III. Some Traditional Exceptions to Freedom of Expression
The court, in Zundel, pointed out that even in the United States, where
the Constitution does not include an express limitation to its freedoms in
the nature of s. 1 of the Canadian Charter, freedom of speech has not
been held to be absolute. The Court pointed to U.S. cases on criminal and
group libel, obscenity and repression of "fighting words" and dangerous
public alarms, such as yelling "fire" in a crowded theater, in support of
its decision to uphold s. 177 of the Canadian Criminal Code without
requiring evidence of the feared harm.34 A careful examination of the
reasons for these particular exceptions to freedom of expression is,
therefore, important. They do not support the court's conclusion.
1. Public Alarms andFighting Words
First, with respect to "fighting" words and dangerous public alarms, these
special cases are clearly distinguishable from Zundel. The purpose of this
category of "speech" is to provoke and instigate the listener to "do"
rather than to persuade him to "think. '35 Moreover, unlike even
"I don't say they (the gas chambers) never existed but I have never seen any myself.
Moreover, I think this (whole question) is a mere detail in the history of the Second
World War." [Wed. Sept. 23, 1987, p.13]
33. This is not to say that there can be no limits to social expression. The right to social
expression, not fettered by fear of proselytizing social effects, does not mean a right to
unfettered social expression irrespective of any effects. The right does not, therefore, preclude
"reasonable and justifiable" limits (eg., under s. 1 of the Charter) - limits reasonably
imposed not for fear of social proselytization of the adult public psyche, but to protect against
undue encroachment on other legitimate social interests. In appropriate circumstances, these
limits may be based on such things as intended audience, mode of dissemination of "speech"
or privacy rights. Thus, for example, one who shouts and screams his social or political views
at all hours of the day and night to his neighbours or foists them on unsuspecting persons by
unsolicited communication through the mails or telephone lines, may be "reasonably
regulated" to protect these other interests for he is not precluded by reasonable regulation from
delivering his message in a less intrusive way. Similarly, the purposes, fears and political
premise of freedom of expression are not violated where what is proscribed is the dissemination
of hate messages by a school teacher in a position of authority to a captive audience of
impressionable school children. See also: -temporary suspension of freedom of social and
political expression, infra, Part V, fourth option.
34. Supra, note 1 at 151-155.
35. This distinction was carefully delineated by the U.S. Court in Yates in the context of
seditious proselytizing. The Court stated that language must be such that it is "reasonably and
ordinarily calculated to incite" so as to urge the listener "to do" rather than merely "to believe."
Yates v. US., 354 U.S. 298 at 325.
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incitement to social intolerance, neither of these utterances seeks to
"convert" the listener, socially or politically. Fighting words provoke the
listener to "do" against the instigator himself; dangerous public alarms to
"do" for himself, not against another. Public alarms make no statement
on the state of society, past, present or future; personal insults profess no
social commentary or historical treatise. The contents of these kinds of
"speech" are not matters directly of public concern beyond their
immediate intended audience.
This category of speech does not invite discussion. There is not time,
nor is it in the nature of provocations and alarms to invite time, for
reflection, thought, discourse or exchange of views. The very idea of
counter-speech for the purposes of exposing falsehood and fallacies is
absurd in the context of provocative personal insults and dangerous
public alarms. Insults and alarms do not invite an "answer" for they pose
no "question." This might not, per se, matter were it not for the
additional fact that the danger of imminent harmful effects is virtually
beyond argument. The essense of the reason for prohibiting these
utterances lies not in any issue of truth or falsity of the "speech" or any
question of proselytic impact but in the virtual inevitability of immediate
harm.3 6 Thus, truthful fighting words ("fight Negro!") are no less
proscribable in appropriate circumstances than false ones ("fight you
cowardly niggar!") and one can falsely yell fire in an empty theatre when
no one is around. Where harm is virtually assured and immediate, the
causal link between speech and harm obvious, counter-speech and social
discourse inapplicable, and social or political proselytizing not at issue,
censorship is clearly permissible. Rejuvenation of political or social truth
through interplay with social or political falsehood, self-development, the
rivalry danger to freedom of expression generally in political acceptance
of the right of social censorship and the very fundamental and pivotal
premise of pluralistic self-government that the people can be trusted with
knowledge of social or political falsehoods, are not at issue nor
challenged by suppression of these categories of "speech."
36. Reflecting this concern for imminent harm in the "to do-to think" distinction, the hate
propaganda section of the Canadian Criminal Code does not accord the defence of truth to
incitement of hatred likely to breach the public peace as it does to promotion of such hatred
(supra, note 9). A test of imminent harm, specifically of a "clear and present danger of
imminent harm" as justification for repression of socio-political or political speech, irrespective
of truth or falsity, was first adumbrated in the U.S. in the context of sedition by Justice Holmes
in Schenck v. U.S., 279 U.S. 47 at 52. It has since undergone modification to allow for active
judicial determination of the likelihood, in fact, of the feared harm. See. Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444 at 448 ("inciting or producing imminent lawless action and likely to incite or
produce such action").
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2. Obscenity
With respect to obscenity censorship, the U.S. Supreme Court has,
indeed, sanctioned its suppression on the grounds that obscenity is not
within the ambit of Constitutional protection of "speech." However, the
reason for upholding censorship has not been the truth or falsity of
obscenity. Rather, the view has been that the nature of obscenity is such
that it cannot qualify as "speech" for constitutional purposes of
protection. A blown-up depiction of genital organs in copulation, for
example, is not "exposition" or "argument" on the state of society.
Obscenity has been suppressed on the grounds that it is a physical
stimulant "to do" rather than a social exercise "to think" that is
presumably disruptive to public morals and order.37 "Obscenity," writes
Clor, "can affect moral values and attitudes. But it does not do so by
making an argument about values and attitudes. '38 Thus, the State may
suppress a blown-up depiction of genital organs in copulation not
because of any question of truth or falsity of the depiction but because it
is not, strictly speaking, suppressing social "exposition" or "argument."
The U.S. Supreme Court has not reversed this "speech-non-speech"
distinction, articulated in Roth v. United States, as the basis for exclusion
of obscenity from the ambit of constitutional protection under the First
Amendment:
All ideas having the slightest redeeming social importance - unorthodox
ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of
opinion - have the full protection of the guarantees, unless excludable
because they encroach upon the limited area of more important interests.
But implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of
obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance .... It has well
been observed that such utterances (lewd and obscene) are no essential
part of any exposition of ideas and are of such slight social value as a step
to truth that any benefit is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality. 39
Any claim to social information or political or social "message" that
obscenity may be said to convey is not precluded from being conveyed
in a more acceptable "expository" form or context "to think" rather than
37. See- Stefan Braun, "Freedom of Expression v. Obscenity Censorship: The Developing
Canadian Jurisprudence" (1955-86), 50 Sask. L. Rev. 39 at 43-44.
38. H.M. Clor in Clor, ed., Censorship and Freedom of Expression, (Chicago: Rand McNally,
1971) at 17.
39. 354 U.S. 476 at 484. While the question of what qualifies as "obscenity" has, in practice,
been fluid, the "speech non-speech" distinction as the basis, in principle, for suppression has
been affirmed. See- Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) at 36 ("In sum, we reaffirm the
Roth holding that obscene material is not protected by the First Amendment.").
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simply "to do."'40 Moreover, while a "raw stimulus" depicting genital
organs in copulation may not be protected, an "exposition" on the
political right and social benefits of viewing such a depiction, whether
true or false, would be. The individual, therefore, even has a
constitutional right to persuade, by exposition or argument, the State to
allow obscenity. But he does not have a constitutional right to force it to
do so. The falsity or truth of the content of obscenity has not been the
criterion for constitutional staying of the proscriptive hands of the State;
the speech-non-speech distinction has.4' Therefore, the more the State
strays across the boundary of censorship of explicit or raw sex (non-
arguments) into suppression of sex or sex-related exposition or arguments
(socio-sexual or politico-sexual speech), the more obvious is the
challenge to the purposes, fears and premise of freedom of expression.
When the claimed social falsehood of a sex or sex-related expression is
presented in an "expository" or "social speech" form "to think" or
"believe" (e.g. "artistic, .... thematic," "instructive") rather than simply "to
do" ("raw sex or sex-related acts"), juxtaposition of counter-speech to
expose social falsehoods and fallacies is directly available. Consistent
with the purposes, fears and premise of freedom of expression in a
pluralistic, self-governing polity, prohibition of such speech for fear of
social effects should be unconstitutional.42
40. Occasionally, the nature of the "idea" is such that an otherwise "obscene" form of
presentation is essential for its intended exposition - "to think." The form per se of the
expression is therefore not always determinative of its character as a mere suppressable sexual
stimulant "to do" or protected social or socio-political exposition or information "to think" or
"to believe." Thus the context of the expression - its purpose or intended audience, for
example - may be more important then its form of expression per se. Thus, a film intended
for medical students for the purposes of instruction on human sexual response, showing a
naked male masturbating and ejaculating, may be constitutionally protected as speech "to
think" rather than mere sexual stimulation "to do" because its form of presentation is an
essential part of the exposition of its "ideas" when directed to its intended audience of medical
students. If specifically directed to the public at large, such "speech" might very well be held
to be suppressable as an obscene stimulant "to do" rather than protected exposition "to think."
See . Re University of Manitoba and Deputy Minister, Revenue Canada, Customs and Excise
(1984), 4 D.L.R. 4th 659.
41. This "to do-to think" distinction would seem to be expressly reflected in the religious
argument defence to wilful promotion of hatred against an identifiable group in the Canadian
Criminal Code section on hate propoganda. Under that section, incitement of religious hatred
likely to breach the peace ("to do") is repressed irrespective of truth or good faith. But wilful
promotion of such hatred, if it is a good faith attempt by argument to establish an opinion ("to
think") upon a religious subject, is allowed even if the speech is false (supra, note 9).
42. Whether even sex or sex-related stimulants "to do" should, nevertheless, be protected
when there is no evidence of a clear and present danger of imminent illegal acts, is a source
of much debate today. (See, eg., Kathlene Mahoney, "Obscenity, Morals, And The Law: A
Feminist Critique (1985), 17 Ottawa L. Rev., arguing against protection if the effect of the
stimulant is promotive of false social attitudes about women. It might be argued, seemingly
consistent with the purposes, fears and political premise of freedom of social expression, that
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3. Criminal and Group Libel
Closer to the facts of Zundel is the court's reference to group libel in
Beauharnais v. People of State of Illinois3 where the U.S. Supreme
Court upheld the conviction of the accused under an Illinois criminal
libel statute for distributing a leaflet that attacked the Negro race.
However, this case is clearly distinguishable from Zundel on the basis of
a significant fact discussed in this article - regard for the political and
"raw sex or sex-related stimulants" conveying false social messages, could safely be muzzled on
the grounds of social falsehoodperse because:
a) the notion ofjuxtaposition of "counter-speech" is inapplicable to, say, a depiction of forced
copulation with a female;
b) proscription would not preclude its indirect, false message of "abuse-loving, inferior
females" from being conveyed in a more acceptable expository form to which counter-
speech is directly applicable.
However, one must distinguish between the urging "to do" (rape) and any by-product of the
stimulant affecting the processes of the mind "to believe" (abuse-loving, inferior females.) In
the absence of a clear and present danger of imminent harm "to do" (rape) (eg., California v.
Larue, 409 U.S. 109, First Amendment protection denied to nude bar room dancing in the face
of empirical evidence showing clear and present danger of imminent harmful acts (crime,
drugs, fighting)), there is time to allow counter-speech and education, "to think" (women do
not enjoy being abused, women have equal rights and dignity with men) to expose the social
falsehoods and fallacies left on the public psyche by the stimulant. It is the essence of freedom
of social speech to compete for the social and political attitudes of the public. Moreover, the
line between what is a mere sexual stimulant "to do" and what is social exposition "to think
or believe" can, in politicalpractice, be a fine one for occasional governing majorities and the
courts to separate ("art can co-exist with obscenity" per Taschereau J. in Brody, Dansky and
Rubin v. The Queen, [1962] S.C.R. 681 at 691) risking the suppression of "thinking" or "social
speech." This might be minimized if occasional majorities and the courts adopt the position
that in close cases "tolerance is to be preferred to proscription" per Porter CJ. (1965), 49
D.L.R. 2d 34 at 40 (Ont. C.A.). It may, therefore, be argued that pioscription of "obscenity",
even in the absence of a clear and present danger of imminent illegal acts, would be within the
"veneer" of the purposes fears and political premise of freedom of social or socio-political
expression if
a) performed, in principle, on the basis of the "to do-to think" distinction and not on the basis
of "truth-falsity" (does not, in principle, preclude false sexual or sex-related "thinking"
social expression);
b) performed, in practice, by occasional governing majorities and the courts, with a consistent
mind to "surgically" err on the side of tolerance (to avoid suppressing "thinking" or sexual-
social speech, causing sexual-social self-censorship or eventual sexual-social censorship
rivalry);
c) such censorship does not become misused as a precedent for censorship in other areas of
social or socio-political speech (censorship breeding censorship, eg., Court in Zundel
pointing to obscenity censorship in support of its censorship of racial or socio-political
falsehoods).
But, absent evidence of imminent illegal acts, leaving "raw" sexual stimulants "to do" free even
if they convey false social messages is, without such big "if's", fully consistent with the
purposes, fears and political premise of freedom of social expression in a self-governing, self-
thinking pluralistic society (truth and enlightenment through counter-speech and education,
not censorship).
43. (1950), 343 U.S. 250.
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social state of society, in this case, 1952 southern U.S.A. Aggregious
racial intolerance and state-sponsored discrimination against the Black
minority, ranging from requirements to sit at the back of the bus, to racist
exclusions from public facilities, employment, housing and public offices,
to verbal and physical assaults, were every-day reminders of the social
and political state of racial intolerance in the South. This was several
years before Brown v. Board of Education,44 when the "separate but
equal" doctrine of Plessey v. Ferguson45 was still good politico-
constitutional law. It was more than a decade before the Civil Rights and
Voting Rights Acts began to accord Blacks, in political practice, the
democratic rights taken for granted by Whites. This was a period where
key political conduits by which a sizeable minority could secure their
human rights - equality before the law in fact, voting rights, freedom of
assembly and association - were still legally or effectively fundamen-
tally denied to them. In short, this was not a truly or "fully" self-
governing polity because both in law and in practice some were denied
the political tools for effective self-representation and self-government
enjoyed by others.
46
The present state of Canadian society can hardly be compared to these
social, political and legal conditions. Acts of racial intolerance are
statutorily proscribed in every Canadian province mainly through
provincial and the federal Human Rights codes.47 Since 1982, basic
political, fundamental and equality rights that governing majorities
themselves must respect, have been enshrined in a constitutionally
entrenched Charter of Rights.48 The Court, in Beauharnais, had full
regard to conditions in the United States, especially the conditions in the
southern states and in the volatile circumstances specifically prevailing in
Beauharnais. It upheld the Illinois statute not simply because it protected
44. (1954), 347 U.S. 483.
45. (1896), 163 U.S. 537.
46. The U.S. Supreme Court's reluctance, articulated in Colgrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, to
scrutinize jerry-mandering of voting districts that often resulted in the exclusion of racial
minorities from effective political representation, only began to wane in the '60s. See
Reapportionment cases: Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) - malapportionment of voting
districts may violate Equal Protection Clause; Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963) - "one
man one vote" principle invalidates Georgia County unit system of primary elections in State-
wide offices; Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) - principle extended to Congressional
districts; Reynolds v . Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) - principle challenges constitutionality of at
least 40 State legislatures. While for some, "disadvantaged" groups ual access to the legal right
of free expression may, in practice, never be fully realized, fettering the right makes such access
grow even more distant.
47. See, eg., Ontario Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1970, c. 318 (as amended); Canadian
Human Rights Act, 25-26 Eliz. 11, 1976-77, c. 33 (as amended).
48. Supra, note 3, s. 32.
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Blacks from defamation, but as a "trial and error experiment" to calm the
long-standing volatile and violent circumstance already existing in the
State. Under the circumstances it was felt that the accused's leaflet left
little doubt that it was, in fact, "likely to cause violence and disorder."
49
The changed social, legal and political conditions in the U.S. since
Beauharnais makes its continued constitutional validity in any future
applications highly doubtful. 50
Nonetheless, even in the context of Beauharnais, the ultimate value of
prohibition of speech for fear of social effects is doubtful. Repressive laws
against political and social speech reside for enforcement in the hands of
those in power. Ultimately, they can always be selectively turned by the
more powerful (e.g. Whites) against the more vulnerable (e.g. Blacks.)5'
In a system of majority rule, the danger of occasional tyrannies by
governing majorities is ever present. In such a system, free speech protects
most the vulnerable minority who cannot form the governing majority to
protect against such tyranny. The oppressed, not the oppressor, most need
and benefit from the freedom to fearlessly speak out against injustice. As
Brandeis observed with respect to the intentions of the Founding Fathers
of the U.S. Constitution: "Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of
governing majorities, they amended the Constitution so that free speech
and assembly should be guaranteed. '52
Though such constitutional "guarantees" did not exist in Canada
before the Charter, the problem did exist. It did not go unrecognized even
then by some members of our highest Court. In Boucher v. The Queen,
the relentless (some would call it paranoid) persecution of the Jehovah's
Witnesses - one of a number of socially undesirable groups at the time
- by the Duplesis government, came before the court. The defendant
Witness was charged with seditious libel for proselytic activities that
culminated in his distribution of a pamphlet, denouncing the government,
courts, police, Catholic Church and people of Quebec for their
49. Supra, note 43 at 259-263.
50. See. Arkes, [1974] Sup. Ct. Rev. 381.
51. Zundel attempted to do just that, using existing legislation, against the historically
vulnerable Jewish community. The Dechenes Commission Report investigating war criminals
in Canada overwhelmingly found that there were "perhaps" such criminals and recommended
immediate prosecution of 20 suspected war criminals and further investigation of 218 others.
Zundel charged Sol Littman, the Canadian representative of the Simon Wiesenthal Center,
with spreading false information, in particular for stating that Nazi war criminals living in
Canada "may number up to 3,000." See- The Canadian Jewish News, Wed. Sept. 23, 1987,
p. 10. Though a Toronto Justice of the Peace rejected the application, the possibility that a
future governing majority may be more sympathetic to those who seek to muzzle vulnerable
minorities from speaking out against injustice, cannot be dismissed. Censorship legislation
might be reformulated as "needed."
52. Supra, note 14 at 377.
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mistreatment of the Witnesses, which the government deemed likely to
cause social dissaffection and possible violence. Rand J. said:
Freedom in thought and speech and disagreement in ideas and beliefs, on
every conceivable subject, are of the essence of our life. The clash of
critical discussion on political, social and religious subjects has too deeply
become the stuff of daily experience to suggest, that mere ill-will as a
product of controversy can strike down the latter with illegality ....
Controversial fury is aroused constantly by differences in abstract
conceptions ... but our compact of free society accepts and absorbs these
differences and they are exercised at large within the framework of
freedom and order on broader and deeper ... basis of social stability.
Similarly in discontent and hostility.., they and the ideas which arouse
them are part of our living which ultimately serve us in stimulation, in
clarification of thought and as we believe, in the search for... truth.. .52a
It was not, therefore, any legal right to proscribe intolerant speech of
Whites that made Blacks progress possible. On the contrary, it was the
unfettering of speech and assembly in the '60s and '70s5 3 - the open,
fearless, robust clash and interplay of speech and assembly - that helped
unfetter bigoted minds. Freedom of speech and assembly, not censorship
and restraint, increased social self-awareness, pride, energy and
determination among Blacks themselves and allowed their newly
discovered counter-voice to educate and even shock public opinion into
accepting the need to pass uplifting laws against intolerant, oppressive
conditions. In a society that practices aggregious intolerance, a legal right
to muzzle social or political falsehoods is likely to hurt most those whom
it is intended to help - the weak, the vulnerable, the oppressed, the out-
of-power or political favour. And in a society without such aggregious
intolerance, prohibition of speech is not necessary and ultimately
dangerous to the very freedom of freedom of expression itself.
4. PersonalLibel of Public Officials
Finally, the court in Zundel referred to libelling of "public officials" -
New York Times v. Sullivan54 and Garrison v. State of Louisiana55 -
52a. [1951] S.C.R. 265 at 288. The persecution of the Witnesses was not confined to the
Duplessis government in Quebec. See- Rex v. Kite, [1949] 2 W.W.R. 195 (B.C.S.C.)
53. See, eg., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 at 26, emphatically rejecting that the
"Constitution, while solicitious of the cognitive content of individual speech, has little or no
regard for that emotive function which, practically speaking, may often be the more important
element of the overall message sought to be communicated," responding to, inter alia, fears of
violence and claims of obscenity as a result of accused wearing cap, in corridor of a court
house, enscribed with the insignia "Fuck the Draft."
54. (1964), 376 U.S. 254.
55. (1964), 379 U.S. 364.
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arguing that even here, freedom of expression, though considerably
liberalised from the position at common law, has not been held by the
U.S. Supreme Court to be completely unfettered. In the New York Times
case Brennan J. for the Court stated:
Authoritative interpretations of the First Amendment guarantee have
consistently refused to recognize an exception for any test of truth, whether
administered by judges, juries or administrative officials .... The
constitutional protection does not turn upon the "truth, popularity, or
social utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered." N.A.A.C.p v.
Button .... As Madison said, "Some degree of abuse is inseparable from
the proper use of everything ..... [No action for defamation by a public
official can succeed] unless he proves that the statement was made with
"actual malice" - that is, with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not .... 56
The Court also commented on attacks on judges themselves:
Just as factual error affords no warrant for repressing speech that would
otherwise be free, the same is true of injury to official reputation. Where
judicial officers are involved, this Court has held that concern for the
dignity and reputation of the courts does not justify punishment as
criminal contempt of criticism of the judge or his decision .... This is true
even though the utterance contains "half-truths" and "misinformation."
... Such repression can be justified, if at all, only by a clear and present
danger of the obstruction ofjustice.57
These two cases illustrate that the U.S. Supreme Court has indeed
sanctioned repression of certain false "public" speech if a high enough
likelihood of harm or level of moral turpitude is shown. And, the
Canadian Criminal Code section challenged in Zundel does require that
knowledge of falsehood be proved - falsehood per se or mere
recklessness as to the truth are not enough. However, the principles in
these two cases have been confined to the category of personal attacks on
particular "public officials." These are not cases, as was Zundel, of the
State acting on behalf of, and solely to protect, society. In particular, in
the New York Times case, the plaintiff Sullivan tried to argue that the
impugned article by the Times amounted to a personal attack on him and
his official conduct as city commissioner in charge of the police.58 In the
Garrison case, a New Orleans attorney made direct, personally
disparaging statements on the judicial conduct of eight judges. In neither
case did the court find that the victims did or could derive their offence
by virtue only of belonging to a group attacked for its group
56. Supra, note 54 at 271.
57. Id, at 272-273.
58. In fact, the invective by the Times was directed to "they" and "the police," and Sullivan
was not named. See: New York Times - editorial, Saturday, March 29, 1960.
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characteristics or, as in Zundel, by virtue of falsification of a historical fact
distinct to that group. Indeed, in Sullivan, Brennan J. for the Court
refused to allow the line of demarcation to be fudged by expressly
rejecting the attempt to "establish that an impersonal attack on
government operations was a libel of an official [Sullivan] responsible for
those operations?' 59 Attack on the person, not of the group, irrespective
of its individuals, is the essence of the offence. Issues raised by attacks on
the latter are matters directly of general public concern; the former only
incidentally so by first being matters of personal concern. The latter is,
therefore, a subject for unfettered public discussion; the former for
personal, albeit, even then, difficult vindication.
IV. Adjudicating on Social Truths: The Role of The Court
Section II of this article presented the theoretical arguments against
prohibition of social falsehoods in a pluralistic, self-governing polity in
the context of the purposes, fears and premise of such a polity. The
involvement of the criminal justice process in sanctioning State
prohibition of such speech raises an integral but more practical question.
Which is the more effective forum in safe-guarding the public mind from
the feared harm - censorship through the judicial process or unfettered
debate in the public forum? For a number of reasons a court of law is not
an effective or appropriate forum for this type of adjudication.
As an initial observation, it is important not to forget that in a system
of self-government, the ultimate object in a trial of social falsehood, by
both sides, is the public, not the judicial, forum - to capture its more
tolerant mind in the case of the prosecution, its more prejudical instincts,
in the case of the fanatic. Trial or no trial, in a system of self-government
it is ultimately the public who must decide social truth - whom to
believe, how to act and whom to elect. 60 The impressions left on the
public psyche are, therefore, of foremost importance. For a number of
reasons having to do largely with these impressions, trial of fanatics is
counter-productive to its purpose and the best interests of society.
First, the legal procedures of the criminal trial process give a sense of
moral equivalency or dignity of innocence and, therefore, aura of
legitimacy to intolerant views. Trial procedure protects the message of
hate in a way that the public forum need not. Presumptions of innocence,
burdens of proof, legal defences, rules of evidence - all are part of a
59. Supra, note 54 at 292.
60. This is to be contrasted with private libelling of one person by another where what the
public believes is socially and politically unimportant in the process of proving the truth or
falsity of the impugned assertion.
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criminal trial to protect the innocent from wrongful conviction through
the disproportionate and onerous powers of the State.61 In the result, the
"hate-monger" becomes the "defendant," the "oppressor" becomes the
"oppressed." In contrast, the public forum of free expression need not
presume the accused innocent, prove beyond a reasonable doubt each
and every element of his charged offence, his degree of moral turpitude
or knowledge of the truth,62 give equal time to his defence or at least
equally undivided attention to morally unequal messages for fear of
wrongful moral conviction in the forum of public opinion. In short, the
public forum of free speech can discuss and debate messages of hate but
need not accord moral equality through procedural and evidentiary
advantages that the criminal trial process must accord to a "defendant."
Second, the trial forum - any trial forum - singularly protects the
message of hate also because it is a specially "prepared" forum. Unlike
unfettered public debate in the public forum, the trial forum distorts the
image of both the message and the man as he really is. What reaches the
public forum is synthetic and artificial. The defendant speaks not on his
own but through and with the perpetual assistance of his lawyer. The
man and his message are carefully "groomed," rehearsed, sanitized
perhaps, of their more unpleasant warts. What ultimately emerges is a
judicially "packaged" version of the man and his message. The hate-
monger is presented to the public not as he might be in his "natural",
"spontaneous" state - shrill, vindictive, intolerant, arrogant - but as he
appears in a caged, specially "prepared" state - composed, reflective,
intelligent, oppressed. Since in these things the man is as important as his
message and style as significant as substance, an essential element in
shaping and alerting the public mind to the dangers of his message is lost.
Instead, the "medium" becomes the "message. ' 63
Third, in the public forum of free expression, unlike the judicial forum
of strict procedure, establishment of public truth is not prone to be
menaced by procedural or evidentiary error.64 If the defendant appeals
61. Ironically, the same Charter of Rights and Freedoms that the Court in Zundel felt did not
protect the defendant's impugned speech protects, better than the common law, against the
effective prosecution and trial of its feared public message. See supra, note 3, "Legal Rights."
62. On the question of the "real" significance of the degree of moral turpitude of the putative
speaker, see infra, Part V, Theory and Practice....
63. See. Marshal McCluhan, Understanding The Media, Part I, (N.Y., New American: 1964)
64. In Zundel, the defendant succeeded on appeal and a new trial was ordered on several
"technical" grounds involving defects injury selection, misdirection as to the nature of mens
rea required and errors with respect to admissibility of evidence (supra, note 1). Mens rea
presents special difficulties of proof in almost every criminal trial. In ordinary criminal trials,
however, unlike social trials for truth, failure by the State to prove the required mens rea will
exonerate and acquit the defendant of commission of the charged offence. In the case of State
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conviction and succeeds on a difficult procedural or evidentiary point of
technical law, even if applicable to criminal trials generally and not his
trial specifically, he will claim judicial vindication of his views. An aura
of social legitimation will embellish the defendant where there otherwise
would have been none. If he is ordered re-tried because of defects in the
first trial, he will claim moral victory and persecution. The message of
hate becomes turned into the message of the hated. The prosecution has
"no choice" now but to continue prosecution for fear of giving credence
to the defendant's message by accepting failure.65 Whereas, if left to begin
with in the public forum, the man and his message of hate would have
been confronted on their merits in an unemcumbered clash and interplay
of viewpoint and emotions, the trial-appeal process is turned by the
defendant into a tool of lawyerly manipulation and theatre of
legitimation feeding voraciously on evidentiary and procedural error.
Meanwhile, the public can grow increasingly weary of relentless, costly
trials; suspicious of their continued necessity and timing; doubtful of their
ultimate benefit. This is fertile soil in which the image "the mighty State
versus the mere words of an individual" can flourish. The "defendant"
becomes the "underdog." If he ultimately loses, the "underdog" becomes
the "martyr." The defendant plays upon it to maximum advantage. Focus
is diverted from the evil content of the defendant's message to the
question of the continued necessity and wisdom of denial of speech or of
some speech and not others. The character of the defendant's message of
hate becomes increasingly lost in the process of denial of his right to
speak. What may have begun as a trial of social hate increasingly
becomes an issue of social censorship. By putting the speech of
determined extremists on trial, the State puts the public interest in a "no-
win" situation.
Fourth, the very nature of political or social truth is such as not to be
particularly amenable to vindication through the trial process. Political or
social truth is not easily reduced to legal truth and legal truth is not easily
translated into the desired public message. Through the over-whelming
body of eyewitness, historical, documentary and statistical evidence, an
obvious historical fact, such as that the Holocaust occurred, may be easily
proved and the patent factual falsehood of the defendant legally
prosecution of social or socio-political falsehood, however, failure to prove the required mens
rea may, by consequent acquittal, create an aura of vindication of the defendant's fanatical
views.
65. Should the prosecutor decide to appeal an order for a new trial, rather than reprosecute
the defendant, he not only risks losing the appeal but would, in the process, be diverting public
attention from the evil content of the defendant's message to the technical points of procedural
and evidentiary law.
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established. But this is far from fatal to the message of the defendant.
Patent factual falsehoods are usually only part, and often the least
dangerous part, of the overall message sought to be conveyed. In a case
like Zundel, for example, it is far more difficult, if not impossible, to
legally prove false the accused's more subtly important message,
seemingly given credence by the very fact of prosecution, that Western
governments are in the "pockets" of the Jewish "lobby" selectively
favouring them at the expense of other groups, particularly "maligned"
Germans. 66 If anything, it is these larger "splinter" messages, broken off
and magnified by prosecution, that can be far more pernicious and
wrenching to social and racial tolerance. By the very process of relegating
patent falsehoods to the shadows, a "successful" trial process ultimately
moves the message's more intractable and respectable trappings of
innuendo and opinion into the limelight.
Finally, the State can only prosecute facts, not opinion or social or
political innuendo. Realizing this, hate-mongers fearful of successful
"fact" prosecution will be encouraged to shield their messages of hate in
the more intractable, misleading and respectable trappings of socio-
political opinion and innuendo.
67
For all these reasons, court adjudication of social or political truth is
likely to misdirect, mislead and misinform the public interest in a way
that unfettered debate in the public forum of free speech would not. The
trial process shifts public attention to the "by-products" of trial. The
philosophy behind the criminal trial process, particularly in common law
jurisdictions, is to protect the innocent from wrongful prosecution and
persecution by a powerful State. It is not a process developed for the
benefit of the State to enable it to, establish political, historical or social
66. As a result of trial and re-trial, some members of the public may be prone to more easily
infer this from the defendant's assertion in his pamphlet that no race has been so successful in
arousing world sympathy for misfortune also suffered by many others and financially bilking
the German nation as the Jews. See supra, note 1 at 141. The lack of apparant necessity for
trial and re-trial in a matter so obvious that "no reasonable person could dispute it," would
tend to fuel such perceptions.
67. This is exactly what Zundel did after his trial. Illustrating this problem and the resulting
"creeping" social pressures to respond by moving from false fact censorship closer to harmful
opinion repression, are the events surrounding the decision to drop a second set of charges
against Zundel for anti-semitic remarks made in a later CBC radio phone-in show in January
of 1987. The Canadian Jewish News reported: "Finley [one of the lawyers presenting the
prosecution case during ZundeVs appeal of his 1985 conviction for denying the Holocaust]
said, 'Zundel's [January '87 radio] comments were expressions of belief or opinion'. Zundel
said he believed there was no Holocaust, Finley said .... 'Everyone is entitled to his opinion
however distasteful', he told The CJN. Sabina Citron, who laid the charges arising out of the
radio show ... said... 'It is not a proper way to deal with the issue. The charge was laid
because the transgression [radio opinions] was worse than the first one'. [trial for fact denial of
Holocaust]. The Canadian Jewish News, Wed. Sept. 23, 1987, p. 23.
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truth on behalf of a self-governing, self-thinking people.68 The courts are
neither suited nor well-equipped to effectively discharge this role. The
very attempt to do so is misguided. It is a self-defeating and, ultimately,
dangerous misuse of the judicial forum.
V. Theory and Practice in a Range of Options Available to the Court in
Reconciling Freedom of Expression and Social Tolerance
The Supreme Court of Canada has a number of options in attempting to
reconcile freedom of expression with the goal of social tolerance in a
pluralistic democratic polity. These options may be examined as
philosophical and practical points of reconciliation along a spectrum of
possibilities arguably consistent with the purposes, fears and political
premise of democratic government.
1. Social Falsehoods: Censorship of Socially Intolerant False
Exposiions
The court could give full judicial deference, as the court in Zundel did, to
the State's assertion of expected harm to the public interest in social
tolerance. This would permit prohibition of socially intolerant false
exposition in "the air," that is, without a requirement of evidence, in fact,
of the feared social harm, absent censorship. The court would simply
assume that such harm would be caused. The court would only be
concerned that the speech was in fact false and that the degree of guilty
mind or moral turpitude required by the particular statute to convict the
accused - knowledge, recklessness, good faith, reasonable person test
with respect to the falsehood - was in fact proved.69 This option is
objectionable for the following reasons.
First, it is inconsistent with the fundamental premise of self-
government. A system premised on belief in the right and ability of the
68. Continental or "inquisitorial" systems of trial maybe better equipped for this role by virtue
of their non-adversarial and relaxed evidentiary procedures in search of the "whole truth." See
Damaski, "Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: A
Comparative Study" (1973), 121 U. Pa. L. R. 505. On civil procedure see Benjamin Kaplan,
"Civil Procedure: Reflections on the Comparison of Systems," 9 Buffalo L. Rev. 412; Mehren
von Kaplan & J. Shaefer, "Phases of German Civil Procedure" (1958), 71 Harv. L. Rev.
Abandonment of the present adversarial system of trial in order to more successfully prosecute
hate-mongers and social liars is dangerous in the hands of occasional governing majorities. It
would erode the very foundations underpinning procedural and privacy notions of the rights
of the individual (in the matter of social and political thought processes) vis-a-vis the State.
Such prosecution woulct also be in violation of the "Legal Rights" section of the Canadian
Charter.
69. The court would, of course, also be concerned with any other procedural and evidentiary
issues ordinarily arising from any criminal trial.
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people to choose for themselves between good opinion and bad opinion
on the state of society or social history must surely accept that right and
accord that experience with respect to provable fact and absurd fiction.
Second, suppression of false speech for fear of social effects is
subjective and politically speculative. The essence of the offence lies in
the feared tendency of such speech to proselytize society. However, as
noted by Mayton in the context of seditious incitement.
[P]hysical acts such as battery of a public officer, destruction of
governmental property... or even destruction of a draft card.., can be
detected and measured by the five senses .... But with laws against
speech... the offence consists of the speaker's instilling a certain state of
mind in the listener; the offence consists of speech 'directed' to 'inciting'
lawless acts. But no such acts need occur, and the state therefore gains the
power to make relatively subjective and unconfirmed assessments about
mental events. 70
These words are especially appropriate to the even more difficult task of
measuring likely effect of false social speech on the public psyche of
social tolerance. People may not only not be converted by unfettered false
speech but, on the contrary, be positively repulsed by it and become
more, not less, socially tolerant as a result. Not only harmless speech, but
socially beneficial speech may be suppressed. The very right of social
censorship, therefore, admits of unwarranted censorship.
Third, censorship of social falsehoods artificially "bends" and "limits"
public choice by which a self-governing people must decide their social,
economic and political policies. The right allows occasional governing
majorities to "pick and choose" which social falsehoods they will go
after.71 By design or ignorance, these politicians can unwisely or unfairly
select for prosecution only those social falsehoods that they most dislike
or fear, leaving free and elevated those with which they are in sympathy,
rather than those most "detrimental" to society. Politically selective
censorship of social falsehoods forcibly and, therefore, artificially bends,
distorts and limits the "natural" spectrum of public speech from which a
70. T.W. Mayton, "Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of Freedom of Expression" (1984),
84 Columbia L. Rev. 91 at 112.
71. Illustrating the seeds for potential future problems is the "case" of Malcom Ross reported
in the Canadian Jewish News, Wed. Sept. 23, '87, p. 10. The CJN wrote: "Israeli [retired
chemistry professor] argues that Ross, a junior high school teacher in Moncton [New
Brunswick] and author of booklets alleging a world-wide Jewish conspiracy and denying the
Holocaust happened, should be charged .... A report by Moncton School Board ...
exonerating Ross was called 'a cover up' by Israeli. [N.B.] Attorney General David Clark
announced that the province 'would not prosecute Ross' because there was insufficient
evidence.... [Israeli] calls the decision 'a dark blot on the government and people of New
Brunswick - a licencing of anti-semitism'.
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self-governing people must choose their social truths to that which
reflects the more general fears and sympathies of the group(s) in power.72
For the reasons examined in Part IV, however, this result is not likely to
be due to any public vindication of the government's case - it is unlikely
to flow from the trial process of proving truth - but flow from the
political process of selective prosecution and the more general public
social self-censorship for fear of prosecution and costly litigation. Public
fear however is not the same as public belief. Imposed silence is not
genuine belief. Imposed harmony is false harmony. If the fears and
sympathies of the group in power are "good", this prosecution-produced
"fear-belief' chasm represents a latent threat - a foreboding of possible
future troubles against "good". If they are "bad", the chasm is promotive
of then-current State prejudices. "Good", to be safe, needs genuine belief;
"bad", to be imposed, profits from fear. Enduringly tolerant self-
government needs enlightened consent; tyranny and prejudice do not.
Fourth, the right to legislate against mere "words", not just their
effects, endangers the political process of "talking" by which a self-
governing people must decide their policies. The legal right to elevation
of some social falsehoods by politically selective suppression of certain
others encourages competing dominant interest groups to resort to the
police machinery of the State, rather than to counter-speech and
education, to "set the record straight". Social censorship encourages
social censorship rivalry. The legal right offers political legitimation of
force at the expense of talk. The focus subtly begins to shift from
education and counter-speech as the means of rejuvenation and
vindication of social truth to utilization of State force to silence the social
falsehoods of opponents. Social censorship is, therefore, also "political"
censorship. In this process, the weak and the cautious - out of political
favour or political power - may exercise self-censorship for fear of
punishment or costly litigation.
It is true that under a section such as s. 177 of the Canadian Criminal
Code, the putative speaker is allowed to speak social truths - he need
fear speaking only social falsehoods and even then only if he "knows"
that they are false. Yet even here, valuable social speech may be lost.
"Knowing" something is false does not make it false. The putative
72. Section 281.2(3)(c) of the Canadian Criminal Code declares subjects in the "public
interest" discussed for the "public benefit" to be a defence to a charge of wilfully promoting
hatred against an identifiable group where the accused on "reasonable grounds" believed his
statements to be true (supra, note 9). What would constitute "public benefit" in this context
to occasional governing majorities and future courts is difficult to ascertain. At the very least,
the standard is inherently subjective and politically speculative thereby encouraging politically
selective prosecution. Nor is such an expressly political standard amenable to judicially
manageable principles having precedent value.
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speaker may simply be wrong. Especially if the putative speaker is
cautious and reflective - arguably the most desireable social speaker -
he may not risk uttering what he feels he "knows" to be false for fear that
unsympathetic politicians of the day might find his speech "likely to
cause mischief or injury to the public interest in social tolerance." Where
the state of mind required for conviction is only "recklessness" as the
truth of the assertion or, worse still, "reasonableness" as to its truth or
falsity, the scope for self-censorship and politically selective self-serving
or misguided State abuse grows commensurately. 73
The problem with censorship of political or social falsehoods for fear
of social effects is that it tends, in practice, to encourage such progression.
The requirement for example, that knowledge of falsehood be proved for
conviction, encourages recklessness and negligence and discourages
caution and care as to truth or falsity. To the extent that this encourages
dissemination of falsehoods, any test concerned with effectively
preventing dissemination of falsehoods will, by its own "internal logic"
be under an intrinsic and unrelenting pressure to lower its mens rea
threshold to conviction for, say, recklessness or perhaps even "better"
unreasonableness as to falsity.74 While successive governing majorities
compete in the political arena to stay on top of the growing social
censorship game at the expense of counter-speech and education,
increasingly onerous social censorship, by lowering the threshold for
conviction, tends to silence most the honest, the cautious, the weak, the
reflective, the impecunious. Increasingly lost is the process of "genuine
73. At the level of "reasonable grounds" especially there is an enormous danger of loss of
social truth, not just repression of politically selected falsehoods only. Rather than risk
prosecution or bear possibly crushing litigation costs for lack of due diligence as to social truth,
the cautious, weak, reflective or impecunious putative speaker may very well exercise social
self-censorship. This is to be contrasted with private libelling of one person by another where
unwarranted personal self-censorship may have private significance but is socially and
politically unimportant to effective and wise self-government.
74. A "reasonable grounds" test of the defendant's belief in the truth of his assertions is
contained in the Criminal Code s. 281.2(3)(c) defence against the wilful promotion of hatred
against an identifiable group (supra, note 9). The test constitutes a much lower "threshold" for
the right of occasional governing majorities to intervene against speech than would a
requirement of knowledge of falsity which can be exceptionally difficult for the State to prove.
"The state of mind of one who publishes a false document with no honest belief in its truth,
not caring whether it is true or false, is recklessness with respect to its falsity, not knowledge
of its falsity" - Zundel, supra, note I at 188. An onerous and vague standard such as the
"reasonable grounds" test might be applicable to private libel between individuals in tort law
but is hardly appropriate to that pillar of democratic self-government, freedom of social or
socio-political expression. It should have died with the polity of divine Kings and Obedient
Subjects that gave it birth where any social disaffection or hostility, no matter how innocuous,
presented a threat to Divine Rule and Kingly public order. The test has become an
anachronism in a modem, pluralistic self-governing polity. It should be firmly laid to rest for
fear that it may one day be revived as the defence to social censorship.
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talking" - of honestly felt, open, free, emotive debate - without which
social inertia and indifference sets in allowing the deceitful and the
dominant to take the place of truth and moderation.
In a pluralistic, self-governing polity, social censorship, therefore,
ultimately breeds counter-censorship and counter-censorship breeds
more onerous censorship. The strong eventually begin to "squeeze out"
the weak. Determined extremists out of power, unable or impatient to
have their way, will "mask" their true intentions, resort to the safer haven
of "opinion" and "belief', or be forcibly silenced, judicially martyred and
driven underground. The cumulative effect of these events is to elevate
force and denigrate talk, "institutionalize" social censorship rivalry and
stifle "genuine" debate - the key goals of false men carrying messages
of intolerance. The real question of prohibition of political or social
speech, therefore, is not the degree of moral turpitude of the speaker or
the factual accuracy of his words but the likely impact of his message and
the ultimate dangers to self-government of its forcible suppression.
Fifth, judicial suppression of politically selected falsehoods at the
behest of the governing majority, without active review of the likelihood,
in fact, of the feared social harm, undermines the integrity of the judicial
process. The court is made to appear as a political pawn in the hands of
the group in power "slavishly" defering to their "bidding. '75 Members of
the public begin to question why only certain social falsehoods and not
others are censored. The right to court censorship becomes a coveted
political prize that goes with political victory. This encourages political
manipulation of the judicial process by rival groups.
Sixth, the trial process of disproving social falsehoods and proving
moral turpitude elevates false men and false messages. It symbolically
accords them moral dignity. It sloughs off the important spontaneous
excesses of fanatics and accords an aura of vindication through
procedural and evidentiary error. It shifts focus from the merits of the
message on trial to the denial of the right to speak and the theatrics of
trial. Ultimately, it moves the more sophisticated and perniciously
intractable trappings of opinion and social innuendo into the lime-light
by the very process of relegating to the shadows the vulnerable shell of
factual falsehood.
75. This kind of unquestioning judicial deference to the right of occasional governing
majorities to repress social speech may have sat well in the pre-Charter days of parliamentary
supremacy but would seem anathema to post-Charterjudicial protection of an entrenched bill
of rights that guarantees freedom of expression subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed
by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society (supra, note 4).
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2. Language Specifically Urging Social Harm: Censorship of
Incitements to Lawless Acts of Social Intolerance
A second option for the court is to not focus on the issue of falsity of the
social speech or the moral turpitude or mens rea of the speaker but,
rather, on the urgency of the language employed on behalf of social
intolerance. The court could search for a "credible" basis for upholding,
without question, the State's view that it must act against certain speech
for fear of its socially proselytic effects. A theory ostensibly akin to the
reasons behind suppression of "fighting words" or of the right to yell
"Fire!" in a crowded theatre might be employed as a philosophically
credible, judicially manageable standard. The court could, for example,
permit the prohibition only of advocacy ("should do") or, more
immediate, incitement ("do") to acts of social intolerance and not muzzle
false treatises or tracts generally.76 In short, the court could hold that the
State can only muzzle incitement to lawless acts of social intolerance.
It could be argued that such speech is "no essential part of any
exposition of social ideas." 77 Its suppression, therefore, does not prohibit
social exposition or even advocacy, whether true or false. Moreover,
because the essence of the offence of "incitement" is the urgency of the
language (e.g. "hang those cowardly niggars") to harm, not the issue of
the truth, falsity or defamatory nature of the words used ("cowardly
niggars"), at least those problems of self-censorship and self-serving or
misguided State abuse associated with State suppression of social
falsehoods and proof of the accused's mens rea are eliminated. While a
short-run improvement over the first option, this option remains
objectionable for the following reasons.
First, by continuing to punish words, not just their effects, this option
denies a more refined understanding of the fundamental premise of
democracy. That premise may now be restated as follows: A self-
governing people that have the right and ability to decide for themselves
whom to believe must surely have the right to decide what to act on. In
the event that some choose to act illegally as a result of incitement,
ordinary laws against illegal conduct/discriminatory acts are available to
punish the offenders. 78 If only a few would illegally conduct themselves
as a result of inflammatory speech, then the ordinary laws against illegal
76. The Yates distinction made in the context of seditious utterances (supra, note 35). See also:
Noto v. US., 367 U.S. 290 at 298 ("The mere abstract teaching... of the moral propriety or
even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as preparing a group
for violent action and steering it to such action.")
77. The Roth point made in the context of obscenity, supra, note 39.
78. See infra, Fourth Option.
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conduct are sufficient to deal with the problem. And if laws against illegal
conduct are insufficient to deal with the problem because so many people
would ordinarily conduct themselves illegally as a result of inflammatory
speech, then such endemic social intolerance and hatred cannot be
smothered by laws directed against inflammatory speech.
It may, of course, be contended that the premise behind the idea of
self-government through freedom of expression is not faith in the ability
of the people to govern themselves through incitement but through reason
- exposition, considered discourse, argument and reflection on matters
affecting the polity. Prohibition of incitement, therefore, is speech
paternalism only in the narrowest sense. It does not deny the people
exposition, argument or "sober" debate - so necessary to effective self-
government in a pluralistic society. However, as noted by Holms J. in a
case dealing with Communist sedition in the turbulent '20s:
It is said that their [Communist] manifesto was more than a theory, that
it was an incitement. Every idea is an incitement. It offers itself for belief
and if believed it is acted on unless some other belief outweighs it or some
failure of energy stifles the movement at its birth. The only difference
between the expression of an opinion and an incitement in the narrower
sense is the speaker's enthusiasm for the result. Eloquence may set fire to
reason .... [I]f in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian
dictatorships are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the
community, the only meaning of free speech is that they should be given
their chance and have their way.79
The Candian court must ultimately ask itself: is the Canadian social
psyche so perilously frail and its ordinary laws against illegal social
conduct so impotent that it cannot trust itself as a society with knowledge
of the words of intolerance of its worst bigots? If it is, then no amount of
prevention directed against the speech of those who "incite" acts of social
or racial intolerance - any more than laws against the speech of those
who "advocate," "argue," or present eloquent treatises or expositions
against social tolerance - can in the long run save such a society from
the feared harm. If it is not, then focus is better directed to the ultimate
dangers to self-government of State censorship of political or social
speech by occasional governing majorities than to a patronizing fear of
irreparable damage to the health and well-being of the Canadian social
psyche.8 0
Second, unlike the virtual certainty of harmful disturbances flowing
from a right to yell "Fire!" in a crowded theatre or even from personally
79. Gitlow v. US., 268 U.S. 652 at 673.
80. For this reason a "reasonable basis" for censorship is not the same as "demonstrable
justification in a free and democratic society."
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directed insults in the nature of "fighting words," the likelihood of the
feared harm as a result of incitement to lawless acts of social intolerance
is far from certain, but subjective and politically speculative. It is true that
the proscriptive net cast under this option is more specific ("inciting" v.
"causing") and its contours of feared harm less amorphous ("lawless acts
of social intolerance" v. "public interest in social tolerance") than that
cast under the first option. Nevertheless, the question of whether the
listener would be likely to commit lawless acts of social intolerance and
would not do so but for the impugned incitement still requires occasional
governing majorities to make subjective and unconfirmed assessment of
mental events. Harmless, albeit inciteful, speech may be suppressed. The
problem of unwarranted censorship, in any particular instance or political
epoch, remains.8'
Third, the right to legislate against mere words, even if only words of
incitement, still ultimately tends to erode the political process of
"talking," of "genuine debate." Superficially, it would seem to encourage
"talking" by discouraging a form of speech directed to instigating the
listener to "do" rather than to "think." Indeed, incitement would appear
to be the very antithesis of considered discourse. It is not, however,
suppression of social incitement per se that is the real problem here but
that such censorship creates its own pressures and conditions for more
onerous censorship. The tendency for progression from censorship of
incitement to censorship of advocacy and, ultimately, even treatises or
exposition is, in the long run, a problem that is intrinsic in any public
acceptance of the right to suppress speech for fear of its proselytic, social
or political effects.
Rather than eliminating determined voices, censorship of incitement
encourages them to resort to the next permissible category of social
speech - advocacy. This increases social pressures to muzzle racially or
socially intolerant advocacy, which, in turn, encourages the putative
speaker to resort to the next permissible category of social speech -
exposition; in turn, this increases social pressure to prohibit the
dissemination of false expositions.82 At the false exposition level, the
pressures for having, in practice, an effective law by lowering the mens
rea threshold for conviction, is back.83 It is also true that more onerous
81. There may be rare occasions where racial or social violence resulting from incitement
would be virtually inevitable. Special police measures, units, patrols and precautions against
illegal acts could be instituted as needed. In any event, exceptional circumstances do not justify
State discretion to censor speech in every circumstance.
82. This encourages determined extremists, fearful of successful fact prosecution, to couch
their prejudices in the language of "opinion" and "belief." See supra, note 67.
83. And so too, therefore, are the dangers of State abuse and social self-censorship. See supra,
notes 73 and 74.
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social censorship, by enlarging the proscriptive "net", increases the social
"catch" (and the social censorship rivalry). It, therefore, tends to justify
itself by "creating" more "criminals". In the result, one should be wary of
"legal plumbing" that merely plugs the leaks as "needed" along the way
of social censorships but does not appreciate the process or see the
dangers in the direction of the flow.
Further, one is at a loss to discover an enduringly defensible standard
by which to separate categories of permissible speech (e.g. exposition)
from categories of impermissible speech (e.g. incitement) based on fear of
prosyletic social effects. Is the speech of those who incite lawless acts of
social intolerance, in the long-run, more likely to capture the public mind
than the speech of those who advocate, or present eloquent expositions!
treatises cultivating such intolerance? As noted earlier, neither the
"philosophical" persuasiveness 84 nor the "practical" effectiveness85 of the
boundaries of demarcation between these categories of censorship are
"self-evident". Censorship for fear of proselytic social effects knows no
"self-evident", "logical", or "practical" self-limit around which an
enduring and just political consensus can coalesce. It offers no basis in
principle or practice to dissuade a future, possibly more fearful governing
majority from adopting, "as needed", the next, more onerous caetgory of
censorship. These problems are intrinsic where censorship is justified on
the basis of fear of proselytic social effects. Even suppression of
incitement for such fear does not, therefore, simply deny shrill, abusive
and emotional social speech - which is, itself, of value for society to hear
- but it also legitimates a basis and a process by which a possibly more
fearful future governing majority with a different social "bent" can justify
adoption of a more onerous category of censorship or mens rea. For this
reason, any general social censorship for fear of proselytic social effects is
a corrosive short-run palliative creating the conditions for a longer-run
problem from which extrication may be most problematic.8 6 The courts
should, therefore, be alert to the pitfalls of "time-static" or "time-
dependant" reasoning that seeks to justify particular social censorships for
84. See supra, note 79.
85. See notes 92 and 67. See also note 3 regarding the problems with having the line of inens
rea at a relatively ineffective level of proscription vis-a-vis determined extremists.
86. In contrast, this is not a problem with proscription of dangerous public alarms for the
speaker seeks to alarm, not to socially convert. Nor is this a problem even in proscribing
fighting words, for the purpose of the abusive speaker is not to proselytize his listener to harm
others but to confront the speaker himself. Where there is no issue of social competition to
"capture the minds" of the listeners, there is no problem of progressively greater censorship.
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fear of proselytic social effects. As noted by Dickson J. in R. v. Big M.
Drug Mart, "the Charter is intended to set a standard upon which present
as well as future legislation is to be tested." 8 2
Fourth, rather than eliminating true fanatics, increasingly onerous
censorship would tend to incrementally drive them to mask their true
intentions, resort to the safer, more intractable haven of "opinion",
"belief" and "innuendo" or be judicially silenced, martyred and driven
underground.
Fifth, it is true that a number of unpleasant "side-effects" of trial of
social falsehood and mens rea of the defendant are diminished in a test
of proscription based simply on incitement to lawless acts of social
intolerance. Because the matter is not at issue, the defendant does not
have the opportunity to air legally groomed and carefully rehearsed social
falsehoods in the protective, specially "prepared" evidentiary and
procedural'womb of the criminal trial process. Moreover, along with
reducing the length of the trial process, the problem of moral vindication
and persecution through procedural and evidentiary error is also lessened
where neither falsehood nor mens rea need (for the time being, at least)
be proved. Nor, as under the first option, is the putative incitor driven to
substitute a significantly more socially problematic category of speech
than the one he is being censored for.87 Nevertheless, none of the major
problems associated with a socially or socio-politically purposive trial can
be entirely eliminated even in the short run. Evidentiary and procedural
errors may still occur. The inciteful speaker still gets his "day in court".
He still obtains appropriate evidentiary and procedural advantages
accorded to one presumed innocent. He still has lawyerly assistance to
appear other than he might really be. He still may have room for legal
theatrics. Especially if he is convicted, he can still appear to be the
oppressed rather than the oppressor; the martyr rather than the maniac;
the victim of a State in the pocket of the victors. Public focus is still
diverted from the actual content of his speech to denial of a right to
speak. Indeed, trial of social incitement presents its own special
"symbolic" problem; it suggests in the public mind that if there is a
problem with the defendant's speech, it lies not in its content but in its
mode of expression. Focus is diverted from what the hatemonger says to
the way he says it.
Finally, suppression of mere words, even incitement, still tends to
undermine the integrity of the judicial process. The court cannot entirely
86a. 18 D.L.R. (4th) 321 at 359 (S.C.C.).
87. Advocacy for incitement versus opinion and socio-political innuendo for patent factual
falsehood.
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escape the image of a "political pawn" in the hands of the governing
majority where it automatically upholds social censorship based only on
language.
3. Requiring Evidence of Alleged Harm: Censorship of Incitements to
Lawless Acts of Social Intolerance
A third option for the court might be to focus not on the question of
falsity of the message, nor the moral turpitude of the putative speaker, nor
to blindly accept the State's assertion or assumption of social harm.
Rather, the court could adopt the position that each case must be judged
on its own merits and the likelihood of the feared social effects
determined independently by the court in the context of the particular
circumstances of the individual case. The court could, for example,
uphold State censorship of incitements to social or racial intolerance only
where it finds that there was, on the evidence, a likelihood of unlawful
acts as a result of such incitement.88 This would provide judicial
monitoring of potentially self-serving or misguided State prosecutions
absent evidence of likely harm. It would also rebut the unfounded
presumption of the first two options that the occasional governing
majority, in its discretion, either always knows best or can always be
trusted to do best. This option is objectionable for the following reasons.
First, it continues to deny the "refined" premise of democratic self-
government that, in the matter of social beliefs, the people have the right
and the ability to decide for themselves whom to believe and what to act
on and that the ordinary laws against illegal acts borne of socially
intolerant minds are sufficient to deal with those who act illegally.
Second, the problem of determining the likelihood of the feared harm
does not cease to be subjective and politically speculative merely because
a court of law has the final word on the subject. The court possesses no
special social or political clairvoyance into such mental events. It can
only "second-guess" the State. The intrinsic problem of unwarranted
censorship, in any given instance, in a process that speculatively muzzles
speech for fear of its social effects, remains.
Third, the prevailing governing majority still has room to "pick and
choose" which social incitements it will bring before the court. While the
88. This position would seem capable of being embraced by the language of Criminal Code
s. 281.2(1) which punishes incitement of hatred "where such incitement is likely to lead to a
breach of the peace" (supra, note 9). See also: Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 at 448,
involving a leader of the Ku Klux Klan, where the U.S. Supreme Court emphatically rejected
that seditious advocacy was not protected by the First Amendment and held the test of
proscription to be: "inciting and producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action."
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court can reject prosecutions where the assumed likelihood of the feared
or alleged effects was, in its opinion, unfounded, it cannot direct the State
to prosecute in those instances of incitement where lawless socially
intolerant acts would be more likely. The State of the day, therefore, still
has room to prefer for censorship only or chiefly those potentially
trouble-causing incitements with which it is at odds, leaving relatively
free those with which it is in sympathy. Nor does the court's institutional
independence from the political processes and political rivalry that
characterises the social arena ensure that its judgement will either be
predictable, sound or politically untainted by a test that is intrinsically
subjective and politically speculative. Depending on the political
composition of the court at any given time and the penchant for risk-
taking, lottery or simple paranoia of the State of the day, the door to
politically selective State and judicial censorship and manoeuvering is not
closed by this option. In turn, for reasons noted in the second and first
options, the practical and "logical" door to progressively greater
censorship and progressively greater censorship and progressively greater
censorship breeding counter-censorship and more onerous censorship is
not closed in any test of censorship that justifies itself for fear of social
effects.
Fourth, the court will no longer appear to be a "political pawn" of the
State of the day. However, by independently attempting to determine the
subjective and politically speculative question of the likelihood of the
feared effects - a task for which it is neither equipped nor designed -
the court will risk serious politicization in its own right. To the extent that
it is not advisable for a court of law either to be or appear to be arbitrary
or political, determination of events whose likelihood of occurence is
instrinsically subjective and politically speculative is to be avoided.89
Fifth, the problems associated with the effect of the judicial process on
the public perception of the man and his message are considerably
worsened where the likelihood, in fact, of the feared social effects, in
addition to incitement to such effects, must be proved. Establishment of
the required causal link between impugned speech and the likelihood of
lawless socially intolerant acts could turn many a trial into a subjective
and politically speculative social science forum for "expert" opinion by
sociologists, social psychologists, political theorists, historians and other
assorted "duly qualified experts". Along with the lengthened trial process,
89. Should the court be driven by the practical and "logical" pressures of censorship for fear
of proselytic social effects, noted in options one and two, into balancing freedom of expression
and social tolerance at the advocacy or exposition level, the problem of judicial crystal ball-
reading would increase commensurately.
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the defendant's protected opportunities for full legal defence, the aura of
moral legitimation (especially in the event of aquital for Crown failure to
prove the difficult causal link) and the scope for procedural and
evidentiary error, would grow commensurately.
Moreover, any trial of socially purposive speech, even one specifically
based on determination of likely evil social events, cannot escape the
fundamental problem of misdirecting public attention from substance to
the effects of process. To the extent that this third option turns public
focus from simply the language or mode of expression to the additional
question of likely social effects, it is in principal preferable to the second
option. To the extent, however, that even censorship based on
determination of likely social effects diverts public attention from what
the hate-monger says to the validity, in any given case, of denial of his
right to speak - from the issue of hate to an issue of censorship - trial
is not preferable to "unbent" and unfettered discussion of the message in
the public forum of free speech.
Sixth, the problem of driving determined voices to the next permissible
category of speech, ultimately to mask their true intentions or be
judicially martyred and driven underground, remains.
4. Punishment of UnlawfulActs of Intolerance as a Rule: Censorship of
Intolerant Expression for Fear of Social Proselytization as a Rare,
Temporary Exception"
A fourth option for the court is to require the governing majority to:
present overwhelming evidence of likely social harm; show that it is very
90. Examination, in this article, of censorship of intolerant social messages for fear of their
social effects, has been premised on a fundamental distinction between "speech" or its generally
recognized forms of "expression" (distinctively accorded special protection by the Charter) and
"force," "conduct," or "act" (not so protected.) This is not to deny that, in practice, the line of
demarcation can sometimes be less than clear. What has been termed in U.S. jurisprudence as
"speech plus" or "symbolic speech" illustrates well the problem of determining where
protected "speech" ends and proscribable "conduct" begins (expression of protected "speech"
or "expression" of illegal conduct.) See: Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 115 (wearing of cap
enscribed with the words "Fuck the Draft" in the corridor of a court-house protected by First
Amendment); US. v. O'Brian, 391 U.S. 367 (defendant burning his draft card to protest
against Vietnam War - illegal conduct not protected by First Amendment); Cox v Louisiana,
379 U.S. 536, where Mr. Justice Goldberg declared at 555: "We emphatically reject the notion
that the First and Fourteenth Amendments afford the same kind of freedom to those who
would communicate ideas by conduct such as patrolling, marching and picketing on streets and
highways as those amendments afford to those who communicate ideas by pure speech." It
should be stressed, however, that in these kinds of cases as well, the basis of censorship/
proscription of the speech/conduct has not been fear that the messenger's message might
socially/politically convert the listener but protection against encroachments by the impugned
speech/conduct on other social interests (eg., orderly regulation of streets, property rights, draft
registration regulations, etc.) that constitute othenvise illegal conduct.
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great, widespread social harm, unpreventable except by prohibition of
proselytizing-purposive social speech; and demonstrate that ordinary
laws to deal with the problem are inadequate. The court could adopt the
position that, in the ordinary state of Canadian society, these conditions
will not be satisfied by the State. This does, however, leave open the
possibility of social censorship for fear of proselytic effects in
"extraordinary" or "temporary" conditions such as, for example, war,
insurrection or some very rare emergencies that any polity may, at times,
have to face. The occasional governing majority would have to show the
existence and continued existence of these conditions, alien to the
ordinary state of a long-standing pluralistic, self-governing polity and the
temporariness of its measures against social speech, to justify censorship.
The assumption would be that, excepting these extraordinary
condititions, in the ordinary state of Canadian society the ordinary laws
prohibiting unlawful conduct/acts of discrimination rather than
censorship for fear of social proselytization are ultimately the least
dangerous and most effective guarantors of social harmony. Brandeis
words concerning the teaching of "criminal syndicalism" by Communists
- a social and political theory for taking governmental control by
destroying the bourgeoisie as a social class - ring true for social
intolerance today as they did for seditious intolerance in the volatile '20s:
Only an emergency can justify repression .... [E]ven imminent danger
cannot justify resort to prohibition of those functions essential to effective
democracy, unless the evil apprehended is relatively serious. Prohibition of
free speech and assembly is a measure so stringent that it would be
inappropriate as the means for averting a relatively trivial harm to society
.... The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or destruction
of property is not enough to justify its repression. There must be
probability of serious injury to the State. Among free men, the deterrents
ordinarily to be applied to prevent crime are education and punishments
for violations of the law, not abridgement of the rights of free speech and
assembly.91
Repression of social speech for fear of its proselytizing effects would,
therefore, be the absolutely last (and temporary), not first, resort against
social intolerance - a temporary or "cooling off' measure during
extraordinary socio-political turmoil. The focus would be on the more
enduring needs of pluralistic self-government. In the ordinary state of
Canadian society, there would be no repression of intolerant social
expression for fear ofproselytizing effects, only of otherwise unlawful acts
of intolerance.
91. Supra, note 14 at 377.
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Society should look to those sections of Federal and Provincial human
rights legislation that proscribe detectable acts of discrimination. These
would include laws against discrimination on such grounds as sex, race,
national origin, colour, etc. in such areas as housing, employment, public
education and access to public facilities. Under the Charter, particularly,
its equality provision, and within the limits of its applicability, oppressed
groups could turn to the courts for redress where the government's own
"house" is not in order. To reach incipient criminal acts borne of
intolerant minds, the State can employ the ordinary criminal laws against
intimidation, threats, extortion, bribery, complicity, conspiracy and
attempts to do illegal acts.92 "Preventive" tools, such as powers of arrest,
search, seizure, judicial warrants, electronic and other kinds of
surveillance, customs and border controls, firearms controls and even
deportation are, if constitutionally utilized, available in appropriate
circumstances to nip illegal acts in the bud.93 Laws against assaults,
trespass, mischief and damage to property can be invoked to control
crowds.94 Even the Criminal Code section against causing a public
disturbance (fighting, screaming, shouting, swearing) and unlawful
assemblies could be employed in appropriate circumstances to reasonally
regulate intolerant expression, though not to prohibit it for fear of its
proselytizing social effects.95 For more serious crimes, laws dealing with
sabotage, treason, riots and arson,96 to name just a few, will normally not
be found wanting in appropriate circumstances. This fourth option is
preferable to all the other options on both theoretical and practical
grounds.
First, it alone is consistent with the premise of democractic self-
government. It assumes that in ordinary conditions in a truly self-
governing polity, the people can best decide social questions for
92. Canadian Criminal Code, supra, note 2, s. 381 (intimidation); s. 305 (extortion); ss. 108,
109 (bribery); s. 21 (complicity); ss. 46, 423 (conspiracy); s. 421 (attempts and accessories).
In Whitney, supra, note 14, Brandeis felt that there was evidence to convict the defendant on
the grounds of conspiracy to commit serious crimes. Even in the case of conspiracy, however,
unlike censorship of speech for fear of proselytizing social effects, repression does not require
the court to make subjective and politically speculative assessments as to likely future mental
events. The essence of the offence of conspiracy is the past agreement itself. Evidence of
agreement is evidence of "conversion," at least in principle. Whether, however, even
conspiracy should be punished absent evidence of any "overt" acts towards illegality, beyond
the agreement itself, is open to serious doubt.
93. Criminal Code, supra, note 2. See especially ss. 449, 450 (arrest without warrant); Part
1V. (Interception of Private Communications - see. R v. Finlay and Grellette (1986), 23
D.L.R. 4th 532); Part ILI (Firearms and Other Weapons Controls).
94. Id, s. 245 (assault); ss. 38-42 (trespass); s. 387 (mischief).
95. Id, s. 171 (causing public disturbance); s. 64 (unlawful assemblies). See notes 33, 90.
96. Id, s. 46 (treason); s. 52 (sabatoge); s. 323 (riots); s. 389 (arson).
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themselves through unfettered democratic debate without politicians or
the courts doing the thinking for them, and if they cannot, even in
ordinary times, then they are incapable of self-government. The only
exception is the existence of "extraordinary" conditions, alien to the
normal state of self-government, sufficiently dire to temporarily suspend
the normal operations of democratic government.
Second, all the fears associated with governing majority censorship of
social speech - "bending" of social speech, self-serving or misguided
State abuse, self-censorship, intellectual dishonesty, chasm between
private beliefs and public pronouncements and ultimately the danger
posed by social censorship rivalry to social enlightenment and to the very
freedom of freedom of expression itself - are eliminated. Argument and
education is elevated; censorship denigrated. Talk is exalted; force
punished. Openess is encouraged; intellectual deceit and political
expediency discouraged. What the public hears is what the public must
deal with. The weak, the cautious and the impecunious need not to be
political outcasts; the strong will not have a monopoly on public
pronouncements. Weak minorities, unable politically to form protective
governing majorities, will not be hounded into silence by oppressive laws
against speech. Martyrs are not made and speech can be judged as it
"really is", on its merits in its "natural" state.
The court will become neither a "political pawn" blindly doing the
bidding of the occasional governing majority as in the first two options
nor an independent political organ in its own right as in the third option.
Refusing to allow itself to become either a pawn of the governing
majority, a tool of the defendant, a political arbiter of social truth, or a
body laying claim to social clairvoyance, the fourth option best permits
a court of law to maintain the dignity and integrity of its processes. By
returning the political issue of social speech and social tolerance for self-
reconciliation to the political forum from where it originated, where it
ultimately will end up anyway and where it ultimately belongs in a
system of self-government, the court will be doing itself and society a
great service.
VI. Conclusion
If freedom of expression means the right to speak only social or political
truths, then there is no real freedom of expression. Legal "plumbers" may
try to tempor the harsher implications of this by carefully limiting
proscription to social "facts" not social "opinion". They may place
onerous mens rea requirements in the way of conviction - e.g., the
putative speaker may have the right to be wrong but not to be
"knowingly" wrong. They may deem free speech to extend to unfettered
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criticism of some groups and, perhaps, some subjects but not all groups
and all subjects. Censorship and its ostensible vindication of social truth
and protection of the social psyche might be limited to cases of
vilification of certain "identifiable" groups and not others, as determined
from time to time by accepted political criteria of occasional governing
majorities. These criteria may reflect such things as the size, cohesiveness,
biological, historical or social "characteristics of the group; ability to
"defend" itself; economic, social, political, familial or other "socially
relevant" status; extent of past, present, or perhaps even likely future
suffering; the nature of such suffering - physical, psychological,
economic, political; or even, perhaps one day, the degree of deemed
personal responsibility for such suffering. Or legal "plumbers" may
"rank" the groups and the degree to which they may be maligned
allowing, say, incitement against a strong group but not against a weak
group or only by members of a weak group against members of a strong
group. Or they may require that a higher degree of mens rea be proved
in social vilification of those not in need of protection than those in need
of protection.
Alternatively, legal "plumbers" may focus directly and solely on the
urgency of the feared proselytizing effects of the impugned social speech,
muzzling only incitements likely to breach the social peace, not on the
falsity of the words, moral turpitude of the speaker or the identity either
of the putative speaker or the intended victim. In short, free speech may
be legally deemed to mean that only some groups can be defamed and
not others, or by only some and not others, or in only certain ways and
not others, or only some social subjects can be broached and not others,
as determined by dominant social beliefs and political configurations
prevailing from time to time.
The central difficulty with all these narrow, legalistic, technical
"solutions", as with any legal search for social Utopia, is that they
ultimately lose sight of the democratic political forest for the individual
legal trees. There is a great danger, as this article has tried to show, when
people in power are allowed to use that power to control what people say
about other people, their social or political history or the state of society,
past or present. Freedom of social and political expression is not "just
another freedom". Such speech is the means or process by which social,
economic and political policies are aired, understood, determined and
changed by a self-governing people to enable them to better cope with
the exigencies of their period. Particular policies may be constrained,
wisely or unwisely, to conform to social, political or economic norms
prevailing from time to time. But one cannot constrain the process or
means by which such policies are determined without constraining the
very ability of the people to air, understand, determine and change such
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policies. In short, social or political censorship threatens self-government.
It is true that not all constraints are the same, at least in the short run.
Some are more onerous than others - e.g., opinion v. fact censorship;
exposition v. incitement repression; reasonable person test of falsity v.
knowledge test of falsity; protection, one day perhaps, of lawyers and
doctors v. protection of blacks or women only. But because the
boundaries for muzzling intolerant speech for fear of social proselytiza-
tion are, at best and at any given time, politically debateable and, at
worst, philosophically or practically untenable, they become in political
practice intrinsically arbitrary and artificial. They present no "self-
evident," "logical," or "natural" criteria around which an enduring and
just political consensus can coalesce to block attempts by future different
governing majorities at "different," "better," or "greater protection" (Le.,
more censorship). They can be moved. Thus, acceptance in political
practice of even limited repression, for fear of proselytic social effects, of
the process by which a self-governing people air, understand, decide and
change their social, economic and political policies to cope with the
exigencies of their period ultimately undermines that very process. It,
therefore, strikes at the very pillars that support democratic self-
government.
The purposes, fears and political premise of freedom of expression are
ultimately larger questions of political philosophy. One may disagree
with this article's thesis as to what shape that philosophy should
ultimately take. What is clear, however, is that such questions are not
amenable to an understanding of their wider and deeper implications if
framed in the narrow, legalistic and "time-static" or "time-dependent"
terms examplified by Zundel. Technical approaches, haphazard policy
formulation and "time-static" legal "plumbing" that may have been
adequate to the needs of pre-Charter courts in the heyday of
parliamentary supremacy are sorely inadequate and dangerously
misleading when applied directly to resolving larger questions of political
philosophy under the Charter. Particular policy reasons for repression of
socio-political speech that cannot be sustained in a larger, coherent,
socio-political philosophy that will be as valid to the "needs of
tomorrow" as it is responsive to the "pressures of today," cannot be
upheld. Under the Charter, it is now necessary to articulate defensible
philosophies before we can develop coherent policies. Freedom of
expression to a self-governing, pluralistic polity is far too important to let
"time-transcending" philosophies of its purposes, fears and political
premise, of the kind articulated in this article, be lost sight of in the
seductive "logic" of narrow, legalistic arguments, time-dependant
reasoning or the political pressures (however well-intentioned) of
prevailing times.
